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BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO:  
WHY AMERICAN BANKS REMAIN  
TOO BIG TO FAIL 
Abstract: The 2008 Financial Crisis pushed the American economy to the brink 
of disaster. Fearing Great Depression-like consequences, the federal government 
bailed out several banks deemed “too big to fail.” During the ensuing period of 
reform there were frequent calls to assure that taxpayers would never again be on 
the hook to save an institution because of the risk its size posed to the nation’s 
economic health. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 promised to end this “too big to 
fail” phenomenon and increased regulatory requirements for banks. Still, in the 
decade after the crisis, America’s biggest banks have only grown larger. This 
Note highlights that concerns about the size and power of financial institutions 
are a recurring theme in American history and argues that our current options to 
force the divestiture of banks are inadequate to ensure that no bank is “too big to 
fail.” 
INTRODUCTION 
In the decade following the 2008 Financial Crisis, the American economy 
prospered.1 Emergency government interventions in the financial sector avert-
ed the onset of another Great Depression and stimulated a strong recovery.2 Yet 
the crisis continues to infect American life.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the Middle-Class Dream Under a Benz, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financial-crisis.
html [https://perma.cc/5QCB-MWQ3] (“A decade later, things are eerily calm. The economy, by 
nearly any official measure, is robust. Wall Street is flirting with new highs. And the housing market, 
the epicenter of the crash, has recovered in many places.”). 
 2 Id. (indicating that “the financial sector was supported in spectacular fashion” during the Finan-
cial Crisis). Faced with the prospect of another Great Depression, financial regulators, such as Ben 
Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 2006 to 2014, implemented extensive emergen-
cy lending and capital infusion measures. See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR 
OF THE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 82 (2015) (arguing that the “financial crisis compared to, and 
arguably surpassed, the financial crisis that ushered in the Great Depression”). This was particularly a 
concern for Bernanke who, prior to entering public service, was an academic economist whose schol-
arly work examined the role the rescission of credit played in lengthening and increasing the severity 
of the Great Depression. Id. at 32–34; see Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial 
Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1983) (arguing that 
damage to credit flows because of the widespread failures of banks played an integral role in instigat-
ing the Great Depression). Because of this research and his other academic work examining the “fi-
nancial accelerator theory” of economic downturns, Bernanke specifically advocated that “[f]irst, in 
periods of recession . . . monetary policy should be forcefully deployed to restore full employment and 
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The connection between the crisis and some conditions are obvious: the 
net worth of middle income families trails pre-crisis levels, homeownership 
rates remain low, and wealth inequality has increased.4 Others are more tan-
gential, but compelling: populism returned to American politics, student debt 
rates grew, and the New York Mets endured a decade of mediocrity.5 Though 
many Americans still struggle with the fallout from the crisis, this pain has not 
extended to the crisis’s culprit, America’s biggest banks.6 In contrast, these 
                                                                                                                           
normal levels of inflation. Second, policymakers must act decisively to preserve financial stability and 
normal flows of credit.” BERNANKE, supra, at 35–36. 
 3 See Matt Phillips, The Bull Market Began Ten Years Ago. Why Aren’t More People Celebrating?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/business/bull-market-anniversary.html [https://
perma.cc/L96W-L8CZ] (noting that although the crisis gave way to a ten-year bull market beginning 
in March of 2009, fewer Americans participated in the stock market and reaped these gains). 
 4 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, 
Second Quarter 2019, Release No. CB19-98 (July 25, 2019), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/
files/currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6V5-GGFN] (showing that homeownership in the second 
quarter of 2018 was 64.1 percent, while in the fourth quarter of 2007 the rate was 67.8 percent); Jessie 
Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 13, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CJT-FQGS] (highlighting that between 2013 and 2016, the net 
worth of the bottom 20% of income earners rose 6% while the income of the top 10% of income earn-
ers rose 40%); Schwartz, supra note 1 (“In 2016, net worth among white middle-income families was 
19 percent below 2007 levels, adjusted for inflation. But among blacks, it was down 40 percent, and 
Hispanics saw a drop of 46 percent.”). 
 5 Jason Belzer, Opinion, Why the New York Mets Can Thank Bernie Madoff for Their World Series 
Appearance, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2015/10/30/why-the-
new-york-mets-can-thank-bernie-madoff-for-their-world-series-appearance/#4d45fe2246f6 [https://
perma.cc/6S39-7TMP] (highlighting that the New York Mets had reduced their payroll after the team 
owners lost millions in Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme); Manuel Funke et al., The Financial Crisis Is 
Still Empowering Far Right Populists, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/2018-09-13/financial-crisis-still-empowering-far-right-populists [https://perma.cc/R7WT-
7JRG] (“After five years, voting patterns usually return to their pre-crisis status quo, fractionalization 
within parliaments decreases, and the far right loses its momentum. This time is different. Ten years 
on, fractionalization, polarization, and far-right voting are all alive and well.”); Philip Stevens, Popu-
lism Is the True Legacy of the Global Financial Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.
com/content/687c0184-aaa6-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c [https://perma.cc/SY9B-8T4H] (arguing that 
the lasting legacy of the Financial Crisis will be that it created populist backlash against elites, who 
escaped the crisis largely unscathed). The owners of the Mets, the Wilpon family, lost nearly $170 
million in Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which led them to reduce the team’s payroll and borrow 
money from Major League Baseball to avoid selling the team. Belzer, supra. Prior to the crisis, the 
Mets were among the league’s biggest spenders; after the crisis, the team joined the ranks of the 
spendthrift, small-market squads and posted a winning record just twice between 2009 and 2018. New 
York Mets Team History & Encyclopedia, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.
com/teams/NYM/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/3NYU-WWJQ]; see 2001 Compensation, BASEBALL 
PROSPECTUS, https://legacy.baseballprospectus.com/compensation/?cyear=2001&team=&pos= [https://
perma.cc/K5MD-G4JX]. Still, some have credited the team’s 2015 National League Pennant to its 
shift away from spending big money in free agency and in favor of a renewed emphasis on developing 
young pitchers. Belzer, supra. 
 6 Peter Eavis & Keith Collins, Banks Have Changed. Except All the Ways They’re the Same, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/12/business/big-investment-
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banks, which were rescued by taxpayer-funded bailouts during the crisis, have 
largely returned to business as usual.7 
These bailouts sparked public backlash and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank) promised to eliminate the practice of bailing out banks deemed 
“too big to fail.”8 But, instead of breaking up banks, the federal response cen-
tered on increasing capital and liquidity requirements, limiting proprietary 
trading and investments in hedge and private equity funds, enhancing consum-
er protection, and mitigating systemic risk.9 
Many argue that these regulatory enhancements are sufficient, and break-
ing up banks would result in undue harm to the American economy without 
remedying the “too big to fail” problem.10 In particular, opponents of bank 
breakups maintain that there must be large banks to fulfill the needs of large 
businesses that operate transnationally.11 Moreover, some scholars have argued 
                                                                                                                           
banks-dodd-frank.html [https://perma.cc/T58K-NQ3G] (noting that although banks have become 
better capitalized and bank executives’ pay has diminished, the industry continues to be dominated by 
a small number of institutions and exercises tremendous power in Washington). 
 7 Id. (“While the [Dodd-Frank] legislation overhauled much of what banks do, much remains the 
same.”). 
 8 See pmbl. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (stating that the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is “to 
end ‘too big to fail’” and “protect the American taxpayers by ending bailouts”); Ross Douthat, Opin-
ion, The Great Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
10/25/opinion/25douthat.html [https://perma.cc/63TB-CNGK] (noting that in spite of the fact that 
bailouts likely prevented a more severe economic downturn they remained highly unpopular). Recog-
nition of the “too big to fail” problem was not limited to narrow political corners. SIMON JOHNSON & 
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 
100–01, 210–11 (2010). In a 2009 speech, Alan Greenspan, who espoused free market ideals and 
regulatory restraint as Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank from 1987 to 2006, even called for the 
breakup of banks to solve the problems of banks being “too big to fail.” Id. at 100, 210. He argued: “If 
they’re too big to fail, they’re too big.” Id. at 210 (citing Alan Greenspan, Conversation at the Council 
on Foreign Relations C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics: The Global Financial 
Crisis: Causes and Consequence (Oct. 15, 2009), https://www.cfr.org/event/c-peter-mccolough-series-
international-economics-global-financial-crisis-causes-and [https://perma.cc/R3KP-CXMN]). 
 9 MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 322–23, 327 (highlight-
ing the Basel III capital and liquidity requirements instituted by banking regulators after the Financial 
Crisis and the Collins Amendment to Dodd-Frank); id. at 704–09 (explaining the Volcker Rule’s limit 
on proprietary trading and restrictions on “sponsoring or investing in private equity and hedge 
funds”); id. at 581 (describing the origination of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
and the passage of the Consumer Financial Protection Act in Dodd-Frank); id. at 756 (noting Dodd-
Frank’s mechanism to address systemic risk). 
 10 Id. at 761 (noting that big banks provide services not offered by their smaller counterparts); see 
BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 440–41 (arguing that the size of a firm is not the only factor in determin-
ing whether it poses a substantial systemic risk).  
 11 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 760 (“The view from the financial sector is that large com-
plex financial organizations are necessary to serve large global corporations in a world of global com-
petition . . . .”); BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 440 (“[S]urely size also has a positive economic value—
for example, in the ability of a large firm to offer a wide range of services or to operate at sufficient 
scale to efficiently serve global nonfinancial companies. Arbitrary limits on size would risk destroying 
that economic value while sending jobs and profits to foreign competitors.”). 
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that “too big to fail” is a misnomer; rather, systemic risk is a problem of inter-
connectedness, not size.12 Their argument calls into question whether breaking 
up the banks would accomplish its purpose if the activities of smaller versions 
of the same entities continued to be intertwined.13 
Nonetheless, Dodd-Frank’s reform measures leave the “too big to fail” 
problem unresolved and increase the risk that banks will again require 
bailouts.14 Large financial institutions—which are more prone to “short-term, 
high-risk” behavior—pushed the American economy to the brink and imposed 
the costs on its citizens.15 This is particularly concerning given that banks have 
increased in size since the crisis,16 and this concern is heightened by the Feb-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 763 (highlighting that Professor Paul Krugman has argued 
that breaking up banks may be ineffective because “finance is deeply interconnected”); BERNANKE, 
supra note 2, at 440 (“Bear Stearns, which was only a quarter of the size of the firm that acquired it, 
JPMorgan Chase, wasn’t too big to fail; it was too interconnected to fail.”); Jesse W. Markham Jr., 
Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the 
Too-Big-to-Fail Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 273–74 (2011) (noting that the 
problem posed by “too big to fail” banks is not that they are large but that they are entangled with core 
functions of the American economy and capable of having a crippling ripple effect). An illustration of 
the interconnectedness versus size dynamic is the implosion of Enron in the early 2000s, which did 
not trigger discussions of a federal bailout. Markham, supra, at 272. The energy conglomerate—
which was large, but not as entangled with other industries as a comparably large bank—was permit-
ted to fail; its failure, however, did not substantially harm the American economy or energy sector. Id. 
In contrast, during the financial crisis, preventing Bear Stearns’ failure in March of 2008 was seen as 
essential. BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 215 (“[W]e were reasonably sure that [Bear Stearns’] unex-
pected bankruptcy filing would ignite even greater panic. Bear had nearly 400 subsidiaries, and its 
activities touched almost every other major financial firm. It had 5,000 trading counterparties and 
750,000 open derivatives contracts.”); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (FCIC), THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 280–91 (2011) (noting the systemic risk posed by Bear Stearns). This is 
reinforced by the repercussions of federal regulators’ decision not to rescue Lehman Brothers. See 
FCIC, supra, at 343 (concluding that Lehman Brothers’ failure had dire consequences). 
 13 See BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 440 (“[T]he size of a financial firm is far from the only factor 
that determines whether it poses a systemic risk[;] . . . severe financial crises can occur even when 
most financial institutions are small.”). 
 14 See Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123–24 (2012) (not-
ing the “choice of evils” faced by regulators during the financial crisis: either bail out the bank or risk 
severe economic destabilization because of an unsystematic resolution of a bank that is “too big to 
fail”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-
Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 956 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank] (“Dodd-
Frank does not solve the [too big to fail] problem”); Eavis & Collins, supra note 6 (highlighting the 
“defanging” of the CFPB, the delay in implementing the Volcker Rule, and gradual erosion of capital 
holding requirements). 
 15 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed to Preserve the Viability 
of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 255–56 [here-
inafter Wilmarth, Two-Tiered] (“[M]egabanks have shown a strong and persistent tendency to pursue 
short-term, high-risk strategies . . . .”).  
 16 Id. at 264 (“The federal government’s massive support for the largest U.S. financial institutions 
helped them to expand their leading positions in broader segments of the financial markets. The Big 
Four [J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo] and Goldman [Sachs] con-
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ruary 2019 announcement that SunTrust and BB&T Banks intend to merge, 
which suggests that a new age of bank mergers may be on its way.17 
The consequences of these banks’ growth are not solely economic.18 The 
rescue of “too big to fail” banks, while many Americans struggled to stay 
afloat, undermined Americans’ belief in the fair administration of laws.19 This 
has in turn threatened the health of our democratic institutions.20 In sum, the 
failure of Dodd-Frank to restrain America’s biggest banks and the erosion of 
the act’s measures to remedy the “too big to fail” problem call for renewed 
consideration of bank breakups.21 
Though not the laws’ primary focus, Dodd-Frank and the Riegle-Neal Act 
of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) include measures that give regulators the authority to 
                                                                                                                           
trolled total banking and nonbanking assets equal to 56% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2011, up from 43% five years earlier.”). 
 17 Michael J. de la Merced & Emily Flitter, The Financial Crisis Put a Chill on Big Bank Deals. 
That Ended Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
07/business/dealbook/bbt-suntrust-bank-mergers.html [https://perma.cc/FK9P-EPQG] (“The industry 
will be closely watching how regulators react to the BB&T-SunTrust deal. If it succeeds, it could 
usher in an era of deal-making. If it is blocked, the decade-long drought will continue.”). 
 18 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 90 (noting Wall Street’s excessive clout in politics 
through its campaign spending, lobbying, and the revolving door); MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS 
BRANDEIS: A LIFE 326 (2009) (“Brandeis tried to teach . . . that in a democratic society the existence 
of large centers of private power is dangerous to the continuing vitality of a free people.”). 
 19 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 208 (arguing that layering on more regulations will not 
prevent future crises if banks remain the same size); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: 
Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1288–94 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye] (noting the extent to which financial reforms have been undercut 
by Wall Street); Schwartz, supra note 1 (indicating that the harms brought by the financial crisis have 
been shared unequally). 
 20 See Douthat, supra note 8 (“The bailout became law because the legislative branch was stam-
peded with the threats of certain doom. It vested unprecedented economic authority in a single une-
lected official . . . . And it used public funds to insulate well-connected private actors from the conse-
quences of their recklessness. Its creation short-circuited republican self-government . . . .”); see also 
Neil Irwin, Opinion, Why the Financial Crisis Was Bad for Democracy, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-the-financial-crisis-was-bad-for-democracy/2013/
04/05/84d668de-9c73-11e2-9bda-edd1a7fb557d_story.html [https://perma.cc/83N5-B5EZ] (noting 
the democratic consequences resulting from the fact that most major decisions during the financial 
crisis were made by unelected officials rather than Congress). In Democracy in America, Alexis De 
Tocqueville famously noted the importance of fairness to Americans, writing: “Among the novel 
objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forci-
bly than the general equality of condition among the people.” TIMOTHY WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: 
ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 30 (2018). 
 21 See BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 441 (“I agreed with the administration view that breaking up 
large firms was likely not the best way to solve the too-big-to-fail problem, at least not until other, 
more incremental options had been tried and found wanting.”); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, 
at 264 (indicating that the biggest banks have only grown larger since the financial crisis); Eavis & 
Collins, supra note 6 (noting the erosion of post-crisis reforms). 
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break up banks.22 This Note explores the tools these laws give the government 
to break up large banks, why they have gone unused, and potential changes to 
the regulatory structure that could encourage or require the divestiture of large 
banks.23 Part I begins by detailing the history of banking in the United States.24 
It highlights the nation’s aversion to centralized and powerful banking institu-
tions.25 This Part also identifies how the banking industry changed over the 
course of the twentieth century—gradually shedding restraints imposed in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression that culminated in the formation of banks 
that were “too big to fail” and the 2008 Financial Crisis.26 Part II examines the 
current regulatory framework designed to end the “too big to fail” problem and 
provisions of Riegle-Neal and Dodd-Frank that allow the government to break 
up banks.27 Part III argues that these regulatory options are largely inadequate 
and unlikely to be used, thus reform efforts, which would face significant hur-
dles, should center on imposing nondiscretionary asset caps.28 
I. THE UNITED STATES’ HISTORIC MISTRUST OF BIG BANKS 
Americans have long feared the banking sector’s power.29 Nonetheless, 
efforts to restrain this power through the political process have met significant 
resistance.30 These battles have fundamentally shaped banking regulation in 
the United States.31 Section A of this part details the rise of banking in the 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Dodd-Frank and Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(5) 
(2012) (providing regulators the power to force banks to sell or transfer assets when necessary to 
mitigate the grave risk they pose to the United States); id. § 5365(d)(5)(B) (allowing regulators to 
force banks to sell or transfer assets to enable an “orderly resolution”); Riegle-Neal Interstate Branch-
ing and Banking Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A) (2012) (prohibiting the approval 
of mergers that result in a bank controlling more than ten percent of total deposits in the United 
States); id. § 1842(d)(2)(B) (prohibiting the approval of mergers that result in a bank controlling more 
than thirty percent of any state’s total deposits). 
 23 See infra notes 195–245 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 29–155 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 29–155 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 116–155 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 156–219 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 220–245 and accompanying text. 
 29 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 14 (highlighting a historic mistrust of financial institu-
tions in the United States). 
 30 See Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 20, at 1288–94 (indicating staunch opposition 
from Wall Street to Dodd-Frank reform measures). 
 31 See John C. Coffee Jr., Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be 
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2012) (arguing that 
there is only sufficient impetus for financial reform after a major financial crisis and that “[a] good 
crisis should never go to waste”). President Obama’s Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, obviously con-
curred with Professor Coffee’s assessment and, in November of 2008, highlighted that the Financial 
Crisis offered a unique opportunity for reform, saying “[y]ou never want a serious crisis to go to waste 
. . . [and t]his crisis provides us an opportunity to do things that you could not do before.” Gerald F. 
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United States, demonstrating that concerns over the size and power of the fi-
nancial sector are hardly new, while also demonstrating the important role 
played by the First and Second Bank of the United States in developing the 
American economy.32 Section B explains the rise of the trust movement, shows 
how the Panic of 1907 led to emergence of the Federal Reserve Bank, and 
sheds light on how the lack of regulatory oversight contributed to the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.33 Finally, Section C high-
lights the changes imposed after the Great Depression that resulted in the most 
stable banking period in United States history, why deregulatory efforts began 
in the 1970s and continued until the early 2000s, and how these deregulatory 
efforts led to the 2008 Financial Crisis.34 
A. Early History of Banking in the United States 
Since the founding of the United States, banks have generated controver-
sy.35 Indeed, one of the most divisive controversies confronted by the federal 
government in its first half-century of existence was the creation of the First 
Bank of the United States.36 Among the failures of the Articles of Confedera-
tion was its inability to establish proper conditions for economic growth.37 At 
                                                                                                                           
Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122721278056345271 [https://perma.cc/Y3WH-8PTQ]. Still, Emmanuel’s optimism may have 
been misguided. See Coffee, supra, at 1029, 1082 (“It is still too soon to say that the 2008 crisis was 
wasted, but it has not been exploited.”). As Professor Coffee argues, “regulatory oversight is never 
constant but rather increases after a market crash and then wanes as, and to the extent that, society and 
the market return to normalcy.” Id. at 1029. This is compounded by the fact that, “the public’s passion 
for reform is short-lived and support it gives to political entrepreneurs who oppose powerful interest 
groups on behalf of the public also quickly wanes.” Id. These attributes are evident in financial re-
form; the time-window for change is short, and what can be passed will likely be undermined soon 
thereafter. Id. at 1029–30.  
 32 See infra notes 35–75 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 76–115 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 116–155 and accompanying text. 
 35 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 14 (indicating that “[s]uspicion of large, powerful banks is 
as old as the United States”). 
 36 Id. at 15, 17–18 (highlighting the constitutional debate over the First and Second Bank of the 
United States and President Jackson’s “bank war”). 
 37 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224–25, 345 (2004) [hereinafter CHERNOW, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON] (noting that the failure of the Articles of Confederation to encourage capital-
ism drove Alexander Hamilton’s push for a new constitution). Although the Articles of Confedera-
tion’s problems were numerous, financial difficulties posed the most pressing challenge to the new 
country. Id. at 224. The Articles of Confederation did not provide a power to tax, leaving the federal 
government unable to raise money to pay off “the gargantuan debt inherited from the Revolution” 
except through voluntary contributions from the states, which seldom came. Id. at 224, 226. States’ 
attempts to pay their debts through tax assessments were increasingly met with violence, as most 
Americans were equally cash strapped. Id. at 224–25. Rebellions by indebted farmers, such as Shay’s 
Rebellion in Massachusetts, sprang up throughout the Union. Id. at 225. The rebels sought radical 
reforms, which included the annulment of debts and an equal division of property. Id. Though state 
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its birth, the United States had an archaic financial system and was basically 
bankrupt.38 The country’s economic development was hindered by the unavail-
ability of credit and absence of a uniform currency; bartering remained the 
dominant form of economic exchange.39 President Washington’s Secretary of 
the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, believed a national bank was required to 
solve these problems and put the country on the path to economic prosperity 
and political stability.40 
In 1791, Congress heeded Hamilton’s call and passed a bill chartering the 
First Bank of the United States.41 The Bank would have both public and pri-
vate characteristics.42 In addition to accepting deposits from and lending to 
private citizens, the Bank would carry out the government’s fiscal responsibili-
ties.43 Despite fulfilling this governmental function, control of the Bank would 
largely be private, with the government holding only a minority stake.44 
                                                                                                                           
militias put down the rebellions, state legislatures adopted debt-relief measures and weakly enforced 
property rights. Id. at 225, 345. Hamilton was not blind to farmers’ plight, but he believed that the 
state’s actions, which were permitted under the Articles of Confederation, ran counter to what a capi-
talist society required. Id. at 225. This reinforced his belief that rather than states attempting to pay off 
their debts, the country needed a strong federal government that could “redistribute the tax burden 
equitably across the states.” Id. 
 38 See id. at 224 (“Money problems pervaded all others under the Articles of Confederation. 
America was virtually bankrupt . . . .”); Peter Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial Markets 
and Early United States Growth, 42 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 1, 2 (2005) (characterizing the Arti-
cles of Confederation-era American economy as “primitive” and “effectively bankrupt”). In a report 
delivered to Congress in 1790, “[t]he grand total of the national debt estimated by Hamilton amounted 
to $79.1 million, about 40 percent of the estimated gross domestic product (GDP) in 1790.” Richard 
Sylla, Financial Foundations: Public Credit, the National Bank, and Securities Markets, in FOUND-
ING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S, at 59, 67 (Douglas A. Irwin & Richard 
Sylla eds., 2011) (internal citation omitted).  
 39 See CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 347–38, 356 (indicating the absence 
of a uniform currency and that the scarcity of money resulted in bartering). Where deals were not done 
by barter, stand-ins for money were often used instead. Id. at 348. For instance, “in the south, ware-
house receipts for tobacco often doubled as money.” Id. Hamilton believed that a uniform currency 
was essential to ending this antiquated form of exchange and would allow the poor to purchase goods 
in smaller quantities. Id. at 356. 
 40 See id. at 347. Hamilton believed a central bank was vital because “the country required an 
institution that could expand the money supply, extend credit to government and business, collect 
revenues, make debt payments, handle foreign exchange, and provide a depository for government 
funds.” Id.  
 41 Id. at 345, 349. The bank bill was easily passed in the Senate on January 20, 1791, emerging 
less than a month after Hamilton proposed the institution on December 14, 1790. Id. Although the bill 
eventually won approval in the House in a thirty-nine to twenty vote on February 8, 1791, it was op-
posed by a number of southern congressmen on constitutional and geographic grounds—mirroring the 
eventual divide among Washington’s cabinet. Id. at 348–55. 
 42 See id. at 347–49 (noting that Hamilton looked upon European central banks as an example of 
how the combination of public and private funds could unleash economic growth and meet key gov-
ernmental functions). 
 43 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 36 (“The First Bank acted as the federal government’s fiscal 
agent, collecting tax revenues, securing the government’s funds, making loans to the government, 
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President Washington’s cabinet, however, was divided.45 First, there was 
the question of whether it was constitutional for Congress to charter the bank 
through its constitutional power to make laws “which shall be necessary and 
proper,” or if the power to create a bank was instead reserved to the states by 
the Tenth Amendment.46 Second, the Bank debate revealed competing visions 
of American society.47 President Washington’s Secretary of State, Thomas Jef-
ferson, opposed the Bank because it jeopardized his vision of the United States 
as an agricultural society.48 Jefferson specifically feared that, as the govern-
ment’s creditor, the Bank would hold undue power over political decisions and 
lend preferentially.49 In contrast, Hamilton fought for an entrepreneurial socie-
                                                                                                                           
transferring government deposits through the bank’s branch network, and paying the government’s 
bills . . . . [T]he Bank of the United States also accepted deposits from the public and made loans to 
private citizens and businesses.”). 
 44 CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 349. Hamilton advocated for separation 
between the individuals directing the country’s monetary policy and political influence—an insight 
that has retained influence to this day. Id. Nonetheless, he still worried that this would prevent effec-
tive oversight and lead to wrongdoing. Id. This concern, as I will explain, was not unfounded. See 
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19–20 (highlighting attempts by Nicholas Biddle, then-president 
of the Second Bank of the United States, to harm the economy to generate opposition to President 
Jackson’s attempts to shutter the bank). 
 45 See CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 352–54 (noting Hamilton and Jef-
ferson’s competing efforts to persuade President Washington). 
 46 See id. (discussing the constitutional arguments raised by Hamilton and Jefferson). See gener-
ally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); 
id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). Hamilton argued that the abil-
ity to create a bank was a power implied by the Constitution and did not need to be “absolutely neces-
sary” to fall within the ambit of the Necessary and Proper Clause. CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, supra note 37, at 354. This reasoning persuaded Washington to sign the bill in spite of his reser-
vations. Id. Nevertheless, Jefferson was adamant in his belief that Congress did not have the power to 
create a bank and, in the aftermath of the bill’s passage, went so far as to write to James Madison that 
state legislatures that create state banks that cooperate with the central bank could be found “guilty of 
high treason and suffer death accordingly.” Id. at 352. The Supreme Court settled the constitutional 
argument in the seminal case regarding the Second National Bank, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Id. at 355.The Court’s conclusion was decidedly Hamiltonian: Congress could 
create a bank because the Necessary and Proper Clause does not require the exercise of power to be 
absolutely necessary, but rather appropriate to carrying out that power. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
at 419–21, 424 (“[T]he act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance of 
the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land.”); see CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, supra note 37, at 355 (noting that Daniel Webster’s oral arguments in the case “distinctly ech-
oed” Hamilton’s argument to Washington). 
 47 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 14–17 (comparing Jefferson’s vision of America as an 
agrarian society characterized by decentralized political and economic institutions, with Hamilton’s 
preference for strong political and economic institutions that could bolster industry). 
 48 Id. at 14. 
 49 Id. at 17. An additional consideration for Jefferson and southerners was that a national bank 
would foster the commercial sector’s growth, which would endanger the institution of slavery. Id. 
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ty where the government actively supports commerce.50 He believed that the 
Bank was essential to the United States’ economic success because it would 
allow the nascent country to retire its war debts and encourage commercial 
transactions.51 
President Washington sided with Hamilton.52 This decision led to the de-
velopment of a stable financial system that spurred economic progress, im-
proved living conditions, and promoted political stability.53 Capital became 
more readily available as the number of state-chartered banks grew from three 
in 1789 to over two hundred by 1814.54 The increased availability of bank cap-
ital proved particularly potent when combined with a burgeoning equity mar-
ket that enticed foreign investment.55 These factors allowed for the introduc-
tion and expansion of businesses throughout the country.56 
                                                                                                                           
 50 CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 345 (“As treasury secretary, [Hamilton] 
wanted to make room for entrepreneurs, whom he regarded as the motive force of the economy.”). 
Hamilton argued that the key to a prosperous nation was to put Americans’ savings to use. Id. at 347–
48. If citizens deposited their money in a bank, the bank could then lend out that money. Id.  
 51 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 15–16 (noting that the First Bank “functioned broadly 
as advertised by Hamilton,” facilitating transactions and improving the country’s creditworthiness by 
establishing that the United States would honor its debts). Although the divide between Jefferson and 
Hamilton perhaps best illustrates these differences, they were not alone in holding these competing 
views. See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 35. These fundamentally different visions of American soci-
ety were on display when the House of Representatives first considered the bank bill. Id. The division 
could largely be broken out geographically: “all representatives to the ‘eastward’ were for it and all to 
the ‘southward’ were against it, almost without exception.” Id. (quoting RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE 
JR., MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
7–8 (1993)).  
 52 CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 354. 
 53 See Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 38, at 1, 2–5 (arguing that the development of United States 
finance, particularly banks, drove the country’s economic growth during the founding era); Richard 
Sylla et al., Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management During the U.S. Financial 
Panic of 1892, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61, 62–63 (2009) (noting the importance of Hamilton’s six finan-
cial innovations in achieving political and economic stability: “stable public finances and debt man-
agement; stable money; an effective central bank; a functioning banking system; active securities 
markets; and a growing number of business corporations, financial and nonfinancial”). 
 54 Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 38, at 5 (noting that the amount of capital, measured in 1860 
dollars, raised by banks rose “from $3 million in 1790 to $4.26 million by 1840”); Joseph Van Fen-
stermaker, The Statistics of American Commercial Banking, 1812–1818, 25 J. ECON. HIST. 400, 401 
(1965) (indicating that there were three state-chartered banks in 1790 and over two hundred in 1814). 
Indeed, by 1825 the fledgling nation’s banking system had eclipsed its former colonizer. Rousseau & 
Sylla, supra note 38, at 5. Though the country had fewer people, it “had roughly 2.4 times the banking 
capital.” Id.  
 55 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that in 1803 European investors held a 
majority of United States securities). 
 56 See Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 38, at 2–4 (arguing that the development of financial institu-
tions drove the growth of American enterprise from 1790 to 1850). 
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Despite invigorating the United States’ financial system, the First Bank 
faced staunch opposition.57 Congress voted against extending the Bank’s char-
ter after its twenty-year term expired.58 In the wake of the financial turmoil 
initiated by the War of 1812, Congress reversed course and chartered the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States.59 Even after surviving a constitutional chal-
lenge in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Second Bank met the same fate as the 
First Bank after a showdown with President Andrew Jackson.60 
President Jackson’s resistance to the Second Bank was in part econom-
ic.61 He attributed the Financial Crisis of 1819 to the Bank’s lending and fa-
vored hard currency over paper money, which he believed was necessary to 
prevent bankers from expanding or contracting the money supply to the detri-
ment of ordinary Americans.62 
Still, his resistance predominately stemmed from his fear of the Second 
Bank’s growing political influence.63 In addition to carrying on important ad-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the failure to re-charter the Bank in 
1811). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424 (upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank 
as a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause); JOHN MEACHAM, 
AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 208–12 (2009) (detailing the passage of a 
bill re-chartering the Second Bank of the United States and subsequent veto and electoral victory by 
Jackson in 1832).  
 61 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19 (“Jackson, however, opposed the Second Bank on both 
economic and political grounds. He hated paper money and believed only in the hardest of hard mon-
ey—gold and silver. Paper money, he thought, allowed banks and bankers to distort the economy at 
the expense of common people.”); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESS WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 92 (2018) (“Jacksonians blamed the Second Bank’s lending 
practices for the devastating financial panic of 1819, whose effects reverberated throughout the econ-
omy of the 1820s.”). 
 62 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19 (explaining Jackson’s preference for hard money); 
WINKLER, supra note 61, at 92 (indicating Jackson blamed the Second Bank for the 1819 Financial 
Crisis). The Financial Crisis of 1819 occurred when the Second Bank attempted to exchange state 
banknotes for specie—gold and silver coins—at western and southern state banks to pay off debt 
issued to finance the Louisiana Purchase. BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 37. The state banks lacked 
sufficient reserves to meet the request and, as a result, “foreclosed on outstanding mortgages and sus-
pended convertibility of their banknotes. Depositors and holders of banknotes panicked, precipitating 
a series of runs and bank failures.” Id. The Second Bank’s reputation was further tarnished when it 
began foreclosing on numerous properties. Id. (citing RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK 
OF THE UNITED STATES 84 (Nabu Press 2010) (1902)). 
 63 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19 (“[T]he Second Bank’s monopoly over government 
finances gave Biddle and his friends power (and profits) that, [Jackson] felt, rightfully belonged to the 
executive branch. The president was particularly enraged that Biddle used his economic power to 
curry favor with Congress, influencing elected representatives to support his aims . . . .”); MEACHAM, 
supra note 60, at 53 (noting that in the aftermath of the 1828 election Jackson increasingly believed 
that the Second Bank of the United States had grown too strong because it was not accountable to the 
public and “made loans to influence elections, paid retainers to pro-Bank lawmakers, and could con-
trol much of the nation’s economy on a whim”). 
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ministrative tasks as the government’s fiscal agent, the Bank served numerous 
politicians; consequently, many of the Congressman who would dictate the 
Bank’s future owed money to the Bank.64 This included Senator Henry Clay, 
who proposed a bill to re-charter the Bank, intending to use the matter in his 
efforts to defeat President Jackson in the 1832 election.65 When Clay’s bill to 
re-charter the Bank passed both houses of Congress, President Jackson vetoed 
it, denouncing the bank as unconstitutional, injurious to states’ rights, and a 
threat to liberty.66 
The Second Bank would not go down without a fight.67 The Bank’s presi-
dent, Nicholas Biddle, attempted to erode Jackson’s popular support by caus-
ing a recession, which he accomplished by requiring immediate payments on 
state bank bills, restricting access to credit, and significantly reducing the 
money supply.68 The Second Bank’s fate was sealed when President Jackson 
won reelection.69 Unsatisfied with merely letting its charter expire in 1836, 
President Jackson tried to destroy the Bank70 He pushed for the sale of the 
government’s stake in the Bank and, contrary to Congress’s command, at-
tempted to order the withdrawal of the government’s deposits.71 No deposits 
                                                                                                                           
 64 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19. Among the prominent politicians who owed money to 
the Bank were Whig Senators Daniel Webster and Henry Clay; consequently, both supported the 
Bank. Id. Prior to becoming a senator, Webster even defended the Bank before the Supreme Court in 
McCulloch v. Maryland. WINKLER, supra note 61, at 89. 
 65 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 19–20 (noting the electoral dimensions of Clay’s push to 
re-charter the Second Bank four years prior to the expiration of its charter). 
 66 President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10, 
1832), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp [https://perma.cc/9CD9-UKM7] (“[T]he 
powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive 
of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people.”). Declaring the bank unconsti-
tutional, in spite of the Court’s decision in McCulloch, marked a significant change in the conception 
of executive power. See MEACHAM, supra note 60, at 210–11. Jackson’s declaration that “[t]he Con-
gress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitu-
tion” gave no deference to the Supreme Court. Id. 
 67 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 20 (noting the efforts of Nicholas Biddle, the President 
of the Second Bank of the United States, to harm the economy to erode Jackson’s support); WINKLER, 
supra note 61, at 93 (“Biddle used all of his corporation’s amassed resources to fight back. The Sec-
ond Bank called in loans, restricted access to credit, and reduced the nation’s money supply . . . . Ra-
ther than break Jackson’s resolve, Biddle’s aggressive response proved to many the accuracy of Jack-
son’s accusation that the Second Bank was an irresponsible, untrustworthy, and all-too-powerful cor-
poration.”). 
 68 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 20 (detailing President Jackson’s statement to his running mate, Martin Van Buren: 
“The Bank . . . is trying to kill me . . . but I will kill it.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 71 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 38. 
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were removed, but President Jackson’s onslaught diminished the Second Bank 
prior to the expiration of its charter.72 
The economy continued to grow through the remainder of the nineteenth 
century, but President Jackson’s demolition of the Second Bank had significant 
economic consequences.73 Still, Biddle’s ability to stifle the economy to meet 
his own political needs offers a glimpse at what Jackson, and Jefferson before 
him, feared more than a hampered financial system: a country controlled by 
the financial elite.74 They believed it was better that the financial system be 
inefficient than pose a threat to American democracy.75 
B. Economic Concentration of Gilded Age 
Despite the Second Bank’s demise, the ensuing period in American histo-
ry proved prosperous.76 The United States was a leader in technological and 
industrial development.77 The growth of industry, however, was coupled with 
the use of this newfound wealth to influence the political process.78 This was 
especially pernicious because of the power of trusts.79 
The Trust Movement advocated for the rearrangement of the economy in-
to monopolies that would operate without competition or government regula-
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. (“The House rejected a proposal to sell the government’s stock in the Second Bank and 
declared that the bank’s deposits were safe. In 1833, in defiance of Congress, Jackson ordered the 
government’s deposits removed from the Second Bank . . . [a]lthough the government’s deposits were 
never actually withdrawn . . . .”); Jackson fired successive treasury secretaries for not withdrawing the 
money before attempting to nominate future Chief Justice, Roger Taney, to the position. See WIN-
KLER, supra note 61, at 93. The Senate, however, defeated Taney’s nomination. 
 73 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 20–21. Because the Second Bank had functioned as a 
lender of last resort, in ensuing decades the banking system was more vulnerable to bank runs and 
suffered through more frequent and serious economic contractions. BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 38–
39; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 20. Bank runs occur where uneasy depositors rush to with-
draw their funds from a bank and the bank is unable to meet the depositors’ needs because their mon-
ey is tied up in loans, which pay out over time. See Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subor-
dinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 201 (2000). 
 74 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 75 See id. (“Jackson’s victory ensured that a powerful private bank was not able to install itself in 
the corridors of political power and use its privileged position to extract profits for itself, inhibit com-
petition, and hamper broader economic development.”). 
 76 See id. at 21 (noting that the U.S. economy continued to prosper even without the benefits of a 
central bank). 
 77  Id. at 22 (“Americans were among the first to invent or commercialize many new technologies 
that arose after 1800, building companies based on innovation in agricultural implements, canals, 
telecommunications, steam power, railroads, chemicals, and other industries.”). 
 78 Id. at 23. 
 79 Id. at 23–24. 
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tion.80 This movement swiftly took hold in the United States: between 1897 
and 1904, 4,227 Americans companies combined to form 257 conglomerates.81 
It was not until Theodore Roosevelt became President after William 
McKinley’s assassination in 1901 that the government began to counter mo-
nopoly power.82 In contrast with his predecessor, President Roosevelt viewed 
the concentration of economic power as a hazard to democracy.83 He directed 
his Department of Justice to block impending mergers and break up existing 
trusts—resuscitating the Sherman Antitrust Act, which barred monopolistic 
practices, but had largely laid dormant since its enactment in 1890.84 First, 
Roosevelt’s administration blocked the merger of Northern Securities Compa-
ny, a corporation that James J. Hill and John Pierpont Morgan intended to use 
to consolidate power over western railroads.85 Soon after, the Department of 
Justice brought an antitrust action against John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, 
which eventually resulted in the trust being broken up.86 The ensuing Presi-
dents, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, continued to bring antitrust 
actions to curb monopoly power.87 When President Wilson left office, nearly 
all major trusts had been broken up or faced an antitrust action.88 
                                                                                                                           
 80 WU, supra note 20, at 24. In the United States this included industrial behemoths like Standard 
Oil and AT&T. Id. Consolidation was justified on economic and sociopolitical grounds. Id. at 26–28. 
For instance, at the time many attributed the economic recessions of the 1890s to “ruinous competi-
tion,” thus the monopoly, which eliminated competition, was seen as an appropriate salve. Id. at 26. 
Similarly, in line with Social Darwinists’ thinking, which held sway during the era, the “[g]rowth of 
large business is merely a survival of the fittest.” Id. at 26–28 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore 
it would be unnatural for the government to intervene; rather, the small and weak firm should stand 
aside for the large and strong firm. Id. at 28. 
 81 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 24; see also WINKLER, supra note 61, at 163, 168–69 
(detailing that the “Great Merger Movement” occurred as corporations capitalized on changes in state 
corporate law, which no longer limited the size of a corporation, its business purpose, or ability to 
hold stock in other companies). 
 82 See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 432–35 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter CHERNOW, TITAN] (noting that although Theodore Roosevelt’s notoriety as a trustbuster may have 
been “somewhat overblown,” he posed a far more significant challenge to trusts than William McKin-
ley). 
 83 WU, supra note 20, at 49 (highlighting that Roosevelt believed that Wall Street’s corrupting 
influence over the country’s economic policy perverted the democratic process and that failure to 
address this ill may result in the public agitating for the upheaval of a capitalist economy). 
 84 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 25. 
 85 Id.; see also WU, supra note 20, at 48–67 (discussing the Northern Securities litigation). 
 86 WU, supra note 20, at 68. 
 87 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
 88 WU, supra note 20, at 74. Notably, President Taft brought seventy-five antitrust cases during 
his four years in office, exceeding the forty-five brought by President Roosevelt. Id. These were not 
minor actions; the trusts Taft brought actions against included U.S. Steel and AT&T, which were both 
controlled by J.P. Morgan and counted among the nation’s largest trusts. Id.  
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The trust movement was not, however, confined to the consolidation of 
industry.89 It also resulted in the concentration of financial power.90 A small 
number of bankers provided the credit that allowed trusts to purchase their 
competitors’ shares to consolidate their power.91 Lead among these bankers 
was John Pierpont Morgan.92 Nonetheless, the trust-busting movement did not 
reach the banks—a trend that has held into modern times.93 
The concentrated power of the financial industry was apparent when the 
Financial Panic of 1907 sent the stock exchange into free fall.94 The panic be-
gan after a stock manipulation effort initiated runs that enveloped one of New 
                                                                                                                           
 89 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 24. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. (“A handful of bankers led by J.P. Morgan played a central role in this rapid transformation 
of the business landscape, giving Morgan an economic importance unmatched by any financier since 
Biddle . . . . Morgan’s empire handled . . . as high as 40 percent of total capital raised at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.”). 
 93 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 716 (indicating that the antitrust laws had not been used 
against banks throughout much of the twentieth century); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 26 
(noting that concentration in the financial sector grew in tandem with trusts, but the Sherman Act was 
not employed to limit their size). In part, this stems from the widely held belief throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century that the federal antitrust laws, which rely on the Commerce Clause, could 
not be applied to banks because banks could not partake in commerce. BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 
716. The separation of banking and commerce is a long-held policy goal of American banking regula-
tors that arose from a desire to limit the potential economic harm from a bank’s failure and concerns 
that banks would lend money on a preferential basis to harm commercial competitors. See Arthur E. 
Wilmarth Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1554 
(2007). This belief persisted until the Supreme Court held that banking was commerce and, therefore, 
subject to federal antitrust law. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 354 (1963) 
(holding that the antitrust laws applied to banks). Prior to this decision, Congress, believing that the 
antitrust laws were inapplicable, restrained interstate bank consolidation through the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) and the Bank Merger Act of 1960. BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 716. 
Regulators could limit concentration in the banking sector through the antitrust laws and the BHCA 
and Bank Merger Act, but these tools were rendered unnecessary throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century because interstate branching limitations made it virtually impossible for large bank-
ing institutions to accrue market power or attain a monopoly. Id. at 717–18. These geographic re-
strictions began to erode in the mid-1970s and were eventually eliminated by the Riegle-Neal Act of 
1994, which allowed national banks to “operate in a state by acquiring a bank located in the state, 
giving national banks the power to branch nationwide by merger.” Id. at 726. This set off a flood of 
bank mergers, resulting in the creation of large banking institutions. Id. at 726–27. In spite of its ap-
plicability to the banking sector, antitrust law was not used to block the mergers of these companies or 
force breakups in the aftermath of the crisis. Markham, supra note 12, at 268–69. Although the anti-
trust laws have not historically regulated banks’ anticompetitive activities, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis some scholars have proposed that antitrust could be an instrument to remedy the “too 
big to fail” problem. Id. This is unlikely antitrust law’s current emphasis on economic efficiency and 
disregard for social and political factors. Id. at 278. But “antitrust is cyclical,” and sociopolitical fac-
tors may again warrant consideration. E. Thomas Sullivan, Foundations of Antitrust, in THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST 100 YEARS 3, 4 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed. 1991). 
 94 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
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York’s largest financial firms, Knickerbocker Trust Company.95 Knickerbocker 
sold off assets to meet depositors’ demands, but could not meet its obliga-
tions.96 Knickerbocker’s failure prompted runs on other trusts.97 Market uncer-
tainty caused lending to dry up, which compelled would-be borrowers to liqui-
date assets to meet their obligations—further depressing asset values.98 The 
absence of a central bank that could lend money to stymie bank runs magnified 
the economic harm.99 
The financial system only stabilized after J.P. Morgan took matters into 
his own hands; he began lending from his own personal wealth, determining 
which banks should live and which should die.100 The United States Treasury 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. at 26. There were a number of circumstances that contributed to the onset of the Panic of 
1907, which was largely expected by Wall Street. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN 
AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 121 (1990) [hereinafter CHER-
NOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN] (“The folk wisdom of Wall Street says that if a crash is widely ex-
pected, it won’t occur, for a saving fear will filter through the marketplace. This was refuted in 1907, 
when Wall Street spent a cliff-hanging year expecting a crash that came.”). The economy spent much 
of the year teetering on the brink because of “tight money, Roosevelt’s Gridiron Club speech attacking 
the ‘malefactors of great wealth,’ and excessive speculation in copper, mining, and railroad stocks.” 
Id. at 122. The speculative activities of trust companies, however, were the spark that ignited the kin-
dling. Id. “Trust companies were state-chartered intermediaries that competed with banks for depos-
its.” Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Panic of 1907, FED. RES. HIST. (Dec. 4, 2015), https://
www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/panic_of_1907 [https://perma.cc/N2JG-D7ZG]. Historically, 
trusts handled wills and estates, which most banks were not permitted to handle, and were a relatively 
risk-free business. CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN, supra, at 122. Through regulatory loopholes, 
however, they increasingly undertook risky investment and lending. Id. In particular, trusts were vul-
nerable to runs because they held less cash in proportion to their deposits than their banking counter-
parts, while still having to pay depositors on demand. Moen & Tallman, supra (“[Trusts] held a low 
percentage of cash reserves relative to deposits, around 5 percent, compared with 25 percent for na-
tional banks.”). 
 96 CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN, supra note 95, at 123. Knickerbocker Trust failed on 
October 22 after Morgan’s team audited its books and wrote it off as a failure. Id. Knickerbocker’s 
president, Charles Barney, committed suicide after Morgan declined his request for a meeting, leading 
a number of depositors to in turn take their lives. Id. 
 97 Id. at 124 (“The Knickerbocker’s failure triggered runs on the other trusts, especially the Trust 
Company of America . . . .”). Depositors took dramatic steps to pull their funds from trusts, waiting in 
lines through the night and paying stand-ins to save their places. Id. In an effort to slow runs, “trust 
tellers counted out the money in slow motion.” Id. 
 98 See id. (“The price of call money—that is, the interest rate on margin loans to buy stocks—
zoomed to 150 percent. Nevertheless, there remained a shortage of ready funds.”); JOHNSON & 
KWAK, supra note 8, at 26. The Panic of 1907 and the Financial Crisis are eerily similar. Moen & 
Tallman, supra note 95. As economists John Moen and Ellis Tallman highlight, “[t]he trust companies 
in 1907 were like the shadow banks in the financial crisis of 2007–09. Short-term lending during the 
recent crisis came largely from some shadow banks (hedge funds and money market mutual funds) to 
fund other shadow banks (investment banks).” Id. Similarly, “[b]oth the trusts and the shadow banks 
faced runs by their depositors and had to withdraw lending in short-term credit markets.” Id. 
 99 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 27. 
 100 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 45 (noting that Morgan “personally pledged his own money 
to prop up the banking system”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 26 (“[Morgan] and his team . . . 
decided which banks should fail because they were irredeemably insolvent and which should be saved 
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contributed $25 million to fortify Morgan’s efforts, highlighting the govern-
ment’s remarkable trust in the power of a private citizen to remedy a crisis that 
implicated the nation’s financial health.101 The crisis illuminated the risks 
posed by the absence of a central bank, a lightly regulated financial sector, and 
the danger of resting the financial system’s fate in the hands of a single 
wealthy financier.102 
To remedy these problems, there was renewed consideration of a govern-
ment-sponsored central bank that could address a financial panic.103 Nonethe-
less, many still feared the corrosive power of the central bank to redistribute 
taxpayers’ money to reckless banks.104 Debate continued from the aftermath of 
the panic until Wilson became President.105 Support ultimately emerged for the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which created a system of private, geographical-
ly dispersed banks overseen from Washington by a publicly designated Board 
                                                                                                                           
because they only needed some cash to get them through the panic . . . .”). In addition to providing his 
own funds, J.P. Morgan famously bullied other bankers into following suit. BARR ET AL., supra note 
9, at 45 (“Morgan gathered the other financiers in his lavish library and held them there until they 
agreed to provide the funds necessary to stave off collapse.”). Moreover, he even went as far as asking 
religious leaders in New York City “to preach calm in their Sunday sermons.” CHERNOW, THE HOUSE 
OF MORGAN, supra note 95, at 126. 
 101 CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN, supra note 95, at 123–24. 
 102 See id. at 122 (highlighting that after Morgan’s substantial efforts, “America decided that 
never again would one man wield such power. The 1907 panic would be the last time that bankers 
loomed so much larger than regulators in a crisis. Afterward the pendulum would swing decidedly 
toward government financial management.”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that the 
Panic of 1907 was the sort that a central bank would have prevented). Morgan’s efforts effectively 
saved the financial system from ruin, but his actions at the end of the crisis indicate that he expected a 
return on his investment. CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN, supra note 95, at 127. To rescue the 
brokerage firm Moore & Schley, he arranged for his company, U.S. Steel, to acquire Tennessee Coal 
and Iron, one of Moore & Schley’s subsidiaries. Id. Under normal circumstances this would have 
drawn antitrust scrutiny because it greatly expanded the power of Morgan’s steel trust, but President 
Roosevelt elected not to assert any objection because of the panic, allowing Morgan to expand his 
steel empire at a “distress-sale price.” Id. at 127–28.  
 103 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 27 (discussing Senator Nelson Aldrich’s call for “a 
central bank that could act as a lender of last resort in a crisis”). 
 104 Id. In response to concerns about the existence of a “Money Trust” and Morgan’s pernicious 
influence “a special subcommittee of the Housing Banking and Currency Committee, chaired by 
Arsène Pujo of Louisiana, began public hearings on the banking community.” UROFSKY, supra note 
18, at 321. Morgan’s power in the financial sector was pervasive: “78 major corporations, including 
many of the country’s most powerful holding companies banked at Morgans. Pierpont and his part-
ners, in turn, held 72 directorships in 112 corporations, spanning the worlds of finance, railroads, 
transportation, and public utilities. In this era of relationship banking, board seats often meant a mo-
nopoly on a company’s business.” CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN, supra note 95, at 152. Alt-
hough the committee ultimately concluded that there was not clear evidence of a Money Trust, they 
did, however, find that the banking industry was concentrated to a concerning degree. Id. at 155–56 
(“[T]he Pujo committee never proved a Money Trust in a strict conspiratorial sense. Rather, it found a 
‘community of interest’ that concentrated ‘the control of credit and money in the hands of a few men, 
of which J.P. Morgan & Co. are the recognized leaders.’”). 
 105 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 46. 
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of Governors.106 Importantly, the Federal Reserve Act addressed the cycle of 
restricted lending and asset liquidation that characterized the Financial Panic 
of 1907.107 
Yet these safety valves, which undoubtedly limited the harm caused by a 
financial crisis, had an unintended effect of increasing “moral hazard.”108 The 
government’s power to stem the tide of a crisis inadvertently increased banks’ 
risk-taking propensities.109 This was exacerbated by the fact that the Federal 
Reserve Act did not provide adequate regulatory supervision.110 But, even if 
the Federal Reserve Act had provided a regulatory framework, the concentrat-
ed power of the financial sector raises questions as to how effective regulation 
could have been.111 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id.; see Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (establishing the 
Federal Reserve Bank). Initially, President Wilson supported a “plan for a decentralized, privately 
controlled reserve system of not more than twenty independent reserve banks.” UROFSKY, supra note 
18, at 381. Members of the progressive wing of Wilson’s own party, however, believed the bill would 
give banks undue power. Id. at 382. Brandeis ultimately played an integral role in convincing Wilson 
to throw his support behind a more progressive measure that would curb the powerful big banks and 
give “exclusive government control of the reserve system.” Id. at 382–83. In the aftermath of their 
meeting, Wilson abandoned his support for the privately appointed board and proposed the Federal 
Reserve Act to Congress. Id. at 383. 
 107 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 47. First, Federal Reserve Banks were able to issue Federal 
Reserve notes “to expand the money supply.” Id. Second, the Federal Reserve Banks could serve as 
“lender[s] of last resort” by loaning banks money when private lending had otherwise dried up. Id. 
Thus, “Federal Reserve Banks could now . . . inject funds into fundamentally solvent banks experienc-
ing temporary liquidity problems . . . [and] help these banks avoid forced asset sales to meet their 
obligations and also discourage depositors from running on a bank due to concerns over a bank’s 
liquidity.” Id. 
 108 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 29. Moral hazard refers to “the greater tendency of people 
who are protected from the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such behavior.” Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 209 (2008). The term became a common refrain of com-
mentators during the 2008 Financial Crisis after regulators began bailing out banks. See BERNANKE, 
supra note 2, at 147, 162, 204, 218 (noting concerns that extending loans to banks and nonbanks and 
reducing interest rates would exacerbate moral hazard because it would let entities that “misjudged 
risk off the hook”); see, e.g., Paul A. Volcker, Moral Hazard and the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 
2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124511733241717573 [https://perma.cc/FZ4J-77GN] (“One 
unfortunate consequence of the massive public assistance provided both banks and nonbanks in deal-
ing with the present crisis is that moral hazard may, I am afraid, become more deeply embedded.”). 
Nonetheless, as Professor Schwarcz highlights, the phrase was commonly used to describe the behav-
ior of individuals in insurance markets, where the insured individuals had an incentive to cause the 
insured event to occur, and bankruptcy, where safeguarding creditors and debtors from default in-
creased bankruptcy filings. Schwarcz, supra, at 209 n.81. 
 109 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 29. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. (noting that power in the banking industry was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful 
bankers and Brandeis’s assertion that “no methods of regulation ever have been or can be devised to 
remove the menace inherent in private monopoly and overweening commercial power”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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These inadequacies became clear when, after a decade of light regulation 
and irresponsible lending, excessive speculation triggered a stock market crash 
that catapulted the country into the Great Depression.112 After the crash, the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank provided emergency loans to banks, prevent-
ing the failure of even one major bank.113 But these measures failed to address 
the economy’s ultimate undoing; widespread panic overwhelmed smaller 
banks as people rushed to withdraw their deposits.114 Even healthy banks expe-
rienced runs, and lending dried up throughout the economy, causing a severe 
economic contraction that left nearly one in four Americans unemployed.115 
C. Banking After the Crash 
The Great Depression stimulated a fundamental revision of the rules gov-
erning the American financial sector.116 This included the passage of the Na-
tional Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act.117 
Glass-Steagall divorced investment and commercial banking.118 Banks could 
no longer serve the depository needs of individuals and small businesses while 
engaging in securities trading and underwriting for large corporations.119 This 
reduced the clout of financial conglomerates—such as J.P. Morgan & Compa-
ny, which previously took deposits and engaged in investment banking—by 
requiring the breakup of their empires.120 These changes and heightened regu-
latory oversight gave way to a forty-year period of economic growth, no finan-
cial crises, and infrequent bank failures.121 
This regulatory framework began to erode in the 1970s.122 A deregulatory 
mindset took hold as the economy struggled through stagflation—anemic eco-
nomic growth coupled with rising inflation—and Depression-era restraints ap-
peared increasingly obsolete.123 Although banks had proven a safe place to 
store money, depositors flocked to investments yielding higher rates of re-
                                                                                                                           
 112 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 49–50. 
 113 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 32. 
 114 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 50. 
 115 Id. 
 116 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 33. 
 117 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 118 See id. §§ 16, 21 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 378) (prohibiting banks 
that engage in underwriting activities from accepting deposits); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 
34 (discussing how “[t]he Glass-Steagall Act’s separated commercial banking from investment bank-
ing to prevent commercial banks from being ‘infected’ by the risky activities of investment banks”). 
 119 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
 120 Id. at 34. Thus, J.P. Morgan & Co.’s investment banking arm became Morgan Stanley while 
J.P. Morgan & Co. continued to operate as a commercial bank. Id. 
 121 Id. at 36–37. 
 122 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 53–54. 
 123 Id. at 54. 
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turn.124 Banks, however, were prohibited from offering interest on demand de-
posits and could not compete.125 
In an effort to allow the banking sector to remain competitive, Congress 
loosened banks’ regulatory restrictions.126 The banks’ expanded powers culmi-
nated in the Saving and Loan Crisis.127 The crisis took hold as inexperienced 
depository institutions engaged in risky real estate lending; when the market 
turned, these institutions failed in numbers not seen since the Great Depres-
sion.128 Congress subsequently increased lending standards and capital re-
quirements for thrifts, but the deregulatory mood persisted.129 
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, this mood manifested it-
self in a number of important policy choices.130 First, the Riegle-Neal Act of 
1994 eliminated the restrictions on interstate mergers and branching that had 
historically prevented banks from opening or acquiring out-of-state branch-
es.131 Second, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 largely repealed Glass-
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 54–55 (“Banks and thrifts lost billions in deposits to [money market funds], which grew 
from $9.5 billion in assets in 1978 to more than $236 billion by the end of 1982.”). Specifically, in 
1980 President Carter signed into law the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act, which “phased out deposit interest-rate ceilings, broadened the powers of thrifts, and raised fed-
eral deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000.” Id. at 55 (citing 1 FDIC, HISTORY OF THE 
EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 10 (1997)). See generally Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Garn-St. Germain Act, 
which further broadened the commercial lending powers of depository institutions. BARR ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 55. See generally Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 127 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 55. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 57 (discussing efforts to “loosen the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of commercial 
and investment banking” in spite of legislative efforts to increase regulatory requirements for banks 
and thrifts). A thrift is a financial institution that, like banks, takes deposits and originates loans. Id. at 
175. Congress increased lending standards through the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989. Id. at 57. See generally Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). Additionally, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 heightened regulatory standards for banks and re-
plenished the depleted Deposit Insurance Fund. BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 57. See generally Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 
(1991). 
 130 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 56–57 (noting the elimination of interstate branching require-
ments and activities restrictions during the 1990s, which fundamentally changed the nature of the 
banking industry). 
 131 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act §§ 101, 102, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (2012) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u, 1842(d)) (allowing banks to branch 
and merge with other banks across state lines); BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 56 (explaining that 
“[Riegle-Neal] overturned the McFadden Act’s prohibition on interstate branching and permitted 
[bank holding companies] to acquire banks in any other state”). 
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Steagall—though the act’s impact had already been dampened by the Federal 
Reserve’s permissive interpretation of the statute that allowed banks to under-
take securities activities.132 Still, Gramm-Leach-Bliley explicitly permitted 
depository institutions to affiliate with firms that underwrite securities and in-
surance.133 
Federal inaction and preemption were perhaps just as important as legisla-
tive efforts to deregulate banking.134 Congress left derivative contracts and 
credit default swaps unregulated, while federal regulators determined national 
banks did not need to comply with state predatory lending laws.135 The regula-
tory changes also bifurcated the banking system into local banks, which served 
individuals and small businesses, and large banking institutions.136 The large 
institutions, whose share of the banking sector has risen dramatically since the 
1980s, increasingly tailored their operations towards risky, short-term, fee-
generating services.137 When combined with lax bank merger review and tech-
                                                                                                                           
 132 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 57–58. Sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act remain in 
force and prohibit depository institutions—though not their affiliates—from undertaking underwriting 
activities. See 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012) (prohibiting businesses that receive deposits from engaging in 
the underwriting, selling, or distributing of stocks, bonds, or other securities); id. § 24 (Seventh) (al-
lowing banks to serve as securities brokers but prohibiting them from purchasing or selling securities 
on their own account).  
 133 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 57–58. 
 134 See id. at 58–59 (highlighting the role played by unregulated credit-default swaps in instigat-
ing the financial crisis); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECK-
LESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 157–66 (2011) (explaining how federal 
preemption led banks to seek charters with the least intrusive regulators). “Procyclical” financial regu-
lation amplifies economic harm. Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 
47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1184 (2015) [hereinafter McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation]. Regulatory 
intervention tends to occur as credit tightens, while deregulation often occurs during economic expan-
sion when restraint is most needed—in sum, it both over- and under-regulates. Id. at 1185. To correct 
this inadequacy, Professor McCoy advocates for “countercyclical regulation” where rules “become 
binding at the top of the business cycle, when financial firms are profitable and catastrophic risks 
seem small, and by easing regulation at the bottom of the business cycle in order to stimulate the 
economy.” Id. Still, there are significant barriers to regulatory action amidst economic growth. See id. 
at 1229 (“[I]n halcyon times, industry capture and lobbying by other affected constituencies can 
weaken regulators’ resolve. It is hard enough to amass support for needed safeguards immediately 
after a crisis. Doing so when economic conditions are bright can threaten a regulator’s career. When 
memories of disasters grow dim, officials who predict catastrophes based on limited problems are 
often dismissed as Cassandras. Under those circumstances, many officials take the path of least re-
sistance . . . .”). 
 135 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 59 (highlighting how the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 left credit-default swaps unregulated); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 134, at 158 (noting 
that federal regulators “excused national banks and their subsidiaries from having to comply with state 
consumer protection laws related to mortgage lending”). 
 136 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 250–51 [hereinaf-
ter Wilmarth, The Transformation]. 
 137 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 56 (noting that regulatory changes “set off a wave of bank-
ing mergers and acquisitions among superregionals and money center banks, leading to the creation of 
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nological innovation, deregulation, inaction, and preemption set the stage for 
the 2008 Financial Crisis: American banks were now bigger, more risk prone, 
and subject to fewer restrictions.138 
D. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
The 2008 Financial Crisis began as homeowners defaulted on their mort-
gages.139 Many of these were “subprime” mortgages made to borrowers at a 
higher risk of being unable to repay.140 Despite this apparent risk, Wall Street’s 
                                                                                                                           
both large regional banks and the megabanks”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Dark Side of Universal 
Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 963, 975 (2009) (“More than 5,400 mergers took place in the U.S. banking industry from 1990 
to 2005, involving more than $5.0 trillion in banking assets.”); Wilmarth, The Transformation, supra 
note 136, at 251 (“[B]ig banks are pursuing a transaction-based strategy that emphasizes investment 
banking, derivatives, syndicated loans, securitized consumer loans, and other activities tied to the 
capital markets. Each of these lines of business presents significant risks to the banking system.”); 
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 256 (“Between 1984 and 2011, the number of community 
banks fell by more than one-half, and the share of commercial banking assets held by community 
banks declined by almost two-thirds. During the same period, the share of banking assets held by the 
four largest U.S. banks mushroomed from 6.2% to 44.2%.”). 
 138 See FCIC, supra note 12, at xvi (“We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets. . . . More than 30 
years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions . . . stripped away key 
safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.”); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 
256 (noting the role of “transformative changes in banking technologies”). Professor Paul G. Ma-
honey has challenged the narrative that regulation was responsible for the period of calm and deregu-
lation catapulted the economy into crisis. Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 
104 VA. L. REV. 235, 239 (2018) (“[G]iving regulators the power to separate commercial banking 
from securities underwriting or to ban OTC trading of derivatives products would likely not have 
prevented the crisis or significantly reduced its severity.”). Instead, he posits that this era of quiet and 
prosperity should be attributed to “low interest rate risk,” which was ended by “[i]nflation and accom-
panying interest rate volatility.” Id. at 239. Accordingly, the deregulatory actions taken by Congress 
did not “permit previously banned activities relevant to the crisis.” Id. at 254. Professor Kathryn Judge 
agrees that the period of stability was in part caused by the low interest rate risk and that returning to 
the policy of previous decades would not solve the financial system’s woes. Kathryn Judge, Regula-
tion and Deregulation: The Baseline Challenge, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 102–03 (2018), 
http://virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/regulation-and-deregulation-baseline-challenge [https://
perma.cc/X3Z2-MPXV]. Nonetheless, she argues that “[l]aying the demise of the twentieth century 
Quiet Period entirely at the feet of macroeconomics and market forces without acknowledging the 
way the law contributed to changes in the competitive playing field could lead to similarly misguided 
policy prescriptions.” Id. at 104.  
 139 FCIC, supra note 12, at 213–21. 
 140 Id. at 70 (indicating that in 2006 subprime mortgages totaled $600 billion and accounted for an 
astounding 23.5 percent of mortgages originated); see also id. at 217 (detailing the delinquency of 
subprime versus prime mortgages). These homeowners relied on rising home prices to refinance their 
loans, but were unable to do so when housing prices began to fall. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Sys-
temic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 1327, 1368 (2009) (“As lenders raced to the bottom to gain market share, the problem of poten-
tial long-run risk exposure was hidden in the short run by higher housing prices, as the higher prices 
allowed borrowers to avoid default through mortgage refinancings or sales of homes when mortgage 
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appetite for these loans was insatiable: in 1990 subprime loans totaled less than 
$100 billion; by 2005, however, this number had grown to approximately $625 
billion.141 Demand remained high because the risky subprime loans could be 
pooled into securities with other loans and sold off to investors; this removed 
the risk from the originator and spread the default risk across numerous inves-
tors.142 Market participants failed to account for the risk of widespread de-
faults.143 Subprime lessees’ inability to repay their mortgages overwhelmed the 
financial system.144 
The crisis worsened concentration in the banking industry.145 The federal 
government took dramatic steps to prevent the collapse of large financial insti-
tutions, but let small banks fail in droves.146 For instance, the federal govern-
ment spent $543 billion and $315 billion, respectively, to stave off the failure 
of Citigroup and Bank of America.147 Similarly, the Federal Reserve financial-
ly supported Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia and J.P. Morgan Chase’s 
purchase of Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns.148 It also allowed invest-
ment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to change their corporate 
structure to access emergency loans typically reserved for depository institu-
tions.149 These unprecedented rescue measures increased large financial institu-
tions’ power.150 
                                                                                                                           
payments became unsustainable.”). As a result, credit rating agencies reduced the ratings of mortgage-
backed securities to reflect the increased likelihood of default, significantly eroding the value of the 
assets. FCIC, supra note 12, at 226–27. 
 141 FCIC, supra note 12, at 70. 
 142 See id. at 68–71, 89 (“When originators made loans to hold through maturity—an approach 
known as originate-to-hold—they had a clear incentive to underwrite carefully and consider the risks. 
However, when they originated mortgages to sell, for securitization or otherwise—known as origi-
nate-to-distribute—they no longer risked losses if the loan defaulted.”); McCoy et al., supra note 140, 
at 1329–32 (“In the end, many subprime loans had essentially no underwriting. Default risk for sub-
prime mortgages was neither calibrated, reserved for, nor priced.”). 
 143 See FCIC, supra note 12, at xxiii–xxiv (“Collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mort-
gage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis. . . . When borrowers 
stopped making mortgage payments, the losses—amplified by derivatives—rushed through the pipe-
line.”). 
 144 See id. 
 145 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 256–57. 
 146 See id. at 254 (“Federal regulators stood by while more than 450 community banks failed 
between 2008 and 2012. In contrast, regulators allowed only one depository institution larger than 
$100 billion . . . to fail during that period.”). 
 147 Id. at 257 & n.14 (“The bailout packages for Citigroup and [Bank of America] included direct 
capital infusions, asset guarantees, emergency short-term loans, debt guarantees and commercial paper 
funding.”). 
 148 Id. at 258. 
 149 Michael J. de la Merced et al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-
become-bank-holding-companies/ [https://perma.cc/VR5H-68Q8 ] (“Being a bank holding company 
would also give the two banks access to the discount window of the Federal Reserve. While they have 
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Smaller banks were not so fortunate.151 The treasury shuttered the Small 
Business Lending Fund, a component of the 2010 Jobs Act, after investing just 
$4.2 billion of the $30 billion it was allowed to disperse to community 
banks.152 This is particularly troubling because large, not small, financial insti-
tutions were the most culpable.153 Smaller banks were not active participants in 
subprime lending, mortgage securitization, or derivatives markets, three of the 
Financial Crisis’s most important ingredients.154 Like their predecessors during 
the Great Depression, small banks were collateral damage; it was not until the 
crisis-caused recession led to the closure of retail stores and business, resulting 
in defaults in the community real estate market where community banks were 
most active, that small banks began to fail.155 
II. BREAKUP OPTIONS 
The banking industry has become increasingly concentrated over the past 
half-century, but federal regulators can address this problem.156 This Part be-
gins in Section A by discussing the regulatory framework established by Dodd-
Frank to solve the “too big to fail” problem.157 Section B then examines op-
tions federal regulators have to break up banks.158 In particular, it discusses 
provisions of Dodd-Frank that provide financial regulators the power to break 
up banks.159 Finally, Section C explores a component of Riegle-Neal that pre-
vents the Federal Reserve from approving certain mergers.160 
                                                                                                                           
had access to Fed lending facilities in recent months, regulators had planned to take away discount 
window access in January.”). 
 150 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 263–64. 
 151 Id. at 268. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 277–78 (explaining that unlike large banks, “community banks had very little involve-
ment in subprime lending or other forms of securitized lending”). 
 154 Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks After Dodd-Frank, 90 IND. 
L.J. 191, 202–08 (2015). This was reflected in the lower default rate experienced by small banks. 
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 278–79. 
 155 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered, supra note 15, at 279–80. The concentration of power in the banking 
sector has been intensified by the fact that the small banks that did survive have struggled to manage 
compliance costs imposed by Dodd-Frank. Id. at 282–83. 
 156 See id. at 256 (highlighting “far-reaching consolidation” in the U.S. banking industry since 
1984). 
 157 See infra notes 161–194 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 195–208 and accompanying text. 
 159 See infra notes 195–208 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text. 
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A. Dodd-Frank Regulatory Changes 
To prevent another financial crisis and bailouts of “too big to fail” banks, 
the Dodd-Frank Act changed numerous aspects of banking regulation.161 Nota-
bly, Dodd-Frank increased capital and liquidity requirements, limited proprie-
tary trading and investments in hedge and private equity funds, enhanced con-
sumer protection by establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), and provided regulators authority to mitigate systemic risk.162 
In the context of banking, capital refers to the amount of money a bank 
can lose while still meeting its obligations.163 To assure that banks can weather 
losses without failing, modern financial regulation has required banks to hold 
an amount of capital proportional to the riskiness of their assets.164 During the 
2008 Financial Crisis, many banks did not have enough capital to withstand 
asset losses—highlighting the insufficiency of existing capital quantity and 
quality regulations.165 Accordingly, in the aftermath of the crisis, financial reg-
ulators increased the amount and quality of capital that banks are required to 
hold.166 Additionally, regulators imposed stress tests and required that a portion 
of a bank’s assets remain liquid.167 Doing so allowed regulators to supervise 
preparedness for a hypothetical crisis and ensured that a bank could easily sell 
off its assets to withstand financial difficulties.168 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See pmbl. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (stating that the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is 
“to end ‘too big to fail’” and “protect the American taxpayers by ending bailouts”); Wilmarth, Dodd-
Frank, supra note 14, at 986 (noting that government bailouts reallocated “wealth from taxpayers to 
shareholders and creditors of the largest [U.S. financial institutions]”). 
 162 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 163 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 265 (“In functional and simplified terms, capital measures the 
amount of losses that an institution can suffer without impairing its obligations to creditors and other 
claimants.”). 
 164 See id. at 278–79 (noting that modern capital requirements are risk-weighted). Capital re-
quirements have long been a component of banking regulation. Id. at 267. Prior to the twentieth centu-
ry, banks were often required to hold minimum level of capital, regardless of size. Id. Subsequently, 
many states shifted to a capital-to-deposits ratio, where a bank’s deposits dictated the amount of capi-
tal it should hold. Id. These capital-to-deposit ratios, however, were voluntary and fleeting. Id. New 
Deal reforms replaced the capital-to-deposits ratio with a capital-to-assets ratio, reflecting a lesson 
from the 1929 Stock Market Crash: assets, not deposits, posed a greater risk of loss. See id. (discuss-
ing the movement to a capital-to-asset ratio because banks suffer greater losses on their assets, not 
deposits). Still, an explicit minimum requirement was not set until the International Lending Supervi-
sion Act of 1983 was passed, giving banking regulators the power to mandate specific capital levels. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a) (2012) (authorizing federal banking agencies to set capital levels); BARR ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 268–69 (noting the expansion of regulatory authority in the aftermath of “[l]osses 
on major money center bank loans to Latin American borrowers” in the early 1980s). 
 165 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 309, 313. 
 166 Id. at 322–26 (detailing heightened capital regulation employed by financial regulators to 
adhere to Basel III). 
 167 Id. at 314–17. 
 168 Id. at 327–28. 
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Many question whether capital requirements can prevent a crisis.169 His-
torically they have failed because they are “lagging indicators” that a bank is 
unhealthy and are vulnerable to both arbitrage and erosion.170 Separately, the 
Federal Reserve has proposed altering their stress-testing model, weakening its 
potential effectiveness.171 The change would provide more information about 
the model to banks and impose the tests biannually, rather than annually, on 
banks with asset levels between $100 and $250 billion.172 
In addition to taking steps to increase the likelihood that a bank can with-
stand a financial shock, Dodd-Frank also sought to prevent the next crisis.173 
An example of this is the Volcker Rule.174 The Volcker Rule prohibits banks 
from engaging in proprietary trading and significantly limits their ability to 
invest in hedge and private equity funds.175 These activities are inherently 
risky, making it improper for banks to engage in them while safeguarded by a 
taxpayer-funded “safety net.”176 Nonetheless, delayed implementation and the 
inclusion of numerous regulatory exemptions and safe harbors have limited the 
Volcker Rule’s effectiveness.177 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 1009–10. 
 170 Id. at 1010–11. In banking, capital levels are considered “lagging indicators” because they 
tend to change in aftermath, rather than lead-up, to a crisis. See id. at 1010 (highlighting that this oc-
curs “because ‘many assets held by banks . . . are not traded on any organized market and, therefore, 
are very difficult for regulators and outside investors to value,’ and (2) bank managers ‘have strong 
incentives to postpone any recognition of asset depreciation and capital losses’ until their banks have 
already suffered serious damage”). 
 171 Greg Gelzenis, 5 Regulatory Questions for Federal Reserve Chairman Jay Powell, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/02/26/
466615/5-regulatory-questions-federal-reserve-chairman-jay-powell/ [https://perma.cc/NW4L-3G63] 
(decrying the Federal Reserve Board’s decision to relax stress-testing requirements despite their im-
portance). 
 172 Id. 
 173 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 704–05. 
 174 Id. (“Volcker himself acknowledged that the proposed provisions bearing his name would not 
have prevented the Financial Crisis . . . . His view was that the Volcker Rule would not be part of an 
effort to address the problems that might contribute to the next crisis.”).  
 175 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012) (“Unless otherwise provided under this section, a banking 
entity shall not—(A) engage in proprietary trading; (B) or acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or 
other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”).  
 176 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 1026 (highlighting the finding of the Senate Banking 
Committee that it is against public policy and an “inappropriate transfer of economic subsidies” for 
taxpayers to support “proprietary and speculative activities” undertaken by banks). Banks’ “safety 
net” includes federal deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window loans. Id. 
 177 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (providing a carve-out for proprietary trading that is engaged in 
through underwriting or market making, for a customer, or to hedge a risk, and allowing banks to have 
an interest in funds that cannot be sold in the United States); Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra 
note 20, at 1302–03 (noting the inclusion of safe harbors at the urging of the financial industry and 
delayed implementation). 
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Dodd-Frank also sought to prevent future financial harm through the 
CFPB.178 The proliferation of dangerous consumer credit products, particularly 
subprime home mortgages, played an important role in the financial crisis.179 
Prior to the crisis, the enforcement of consumer financial protection statutes 
was spread across numerous agencies where it was not a priority, resulting in 
the insufficient regulation of banking practices.180 To address this vulnerability, 
Congress tasked a single agency with consumer protection.181 The CFPB was 
granted power over all consumer financial protection statutes and given addi-
tional authority to address practices it deemed “unfair, deceptive, or abu-
sive.”182 Just as it fought the Volcker Rule, the financial services industry has 
staunchly opposed the CFPB, attacking it in court and lobbying for its overhaul 
in Congress, which has significantly limited its influence.183 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 64 (noting the creation of the CFPB to address consumer 
financial protection concerns after the 2008 Financial Crisis). 
 179 See FCIC, supra note 12, at 104–05, 213–21 (highlighting the expansion of abusive lending 
practices in home mortgages and subsequent default crisis). 
 180 See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 329–34 (2013) (noting problems with the regulatory structure of consumer 
protection). 
 181 Id. In particular, this addressed concerns that “consumer protection [was] an orphan mission 
that tended to ‘fall between the cracks’ because no agency had an exclusive role of consumer protec-
tion in financial services.” Id. at 330. 
 182 See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (empowering the CFPB to prohibit “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices”); Levitin, supra note 180, at 322 (“The CFPB has a wide regulatory ambit with rulemaking, 
supervision, and enforcement authority over nearly all firms involved in consumer financial services, 
irrespective of their particular legal form.”).  
 183 See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing that the CFPB 
be supplanted by an executive agency with a director who is removable at-will); PHH Corp. v. Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (determining that the CFPB was 
constitutionally structured because its unitary director with for-cause removal protection does not 
impinge on the President’s duties under Article II); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, 
LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (disagreeing with the en banc holding of the D.C. 
Circuit in PHH Corp. and instead deeming the CFPB wholly invalid because its unitary director vio-
lates separation of powers principles); Glenn Thrush & Allan Rappeport, ‘Like a Mosquito in a Nudist 
Colony’: How Mick Mulvaney Found Plenty to Target at Consumer Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/mick-mulvaney-budget-director-consumer-bureau.
html [https://perma.cc/L4QY-C2AK] (indicating that while acting as the interim director of the CFPB, 
acting White House Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney had “halted all new investigations, frozen hiring, 
stopped data collection and proposed cutting off public access to a database of consumer complaints[,] 
. . . dropped most cases against payday lenders[, and] . . . tried hard to persuade Congress to take away 
funding authority for the bureau from the Federal Reserve”). See generally Logan Hovie, Comment, A 
Tragedy of Novelty: Is For-Cause Removal Protection for the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau’s Single Director a Fatal Flaw?, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-100 (2019), https://lawdigital
commons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3749&context=bclr [https://perma.cc/V554-XWLW] 
(highlighting constitutional challenges to the CFPB). 
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Finally, Dodd-Frank provides heightened prudential regulation and super-
vision based on a bank’s total assets.184 This power is intended to address the 
systemic risk posed by the failure of large and interconnected banks.185 The 
framework imposes increasingly stringent regulation as banks grow larger, 
with the country’s largest banks, dubbed global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs), facing the highest requirements.186 This includes maintaining a 
higher ratio of capital-to-assets, meeting a more demanding leverage ratio, and 
submitting an orderly resolution plan.187 In short, these provisions, which 
largely heighten existing expectations for large banks under Dodd-Frank, are 
an attempt to address the “too big to fail” problem.188 
Like many other components of the Dodd-Frank Act, these regulatory re-
quirements have been delayed and weakened.189 From the start G-SIBs fought 
enhanced prudential requirements; decrying any connection between a bank’s 
size and systemic risk, a number of bank CEOs personally pressured then Fed-
eral Reserve Board Governor Daniel Tarullo to relax the requirements.190 The 
banks succeeded.191 Moreover, the rules that survived the initial onslaught are 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1) (2012) (providing the Federal Reserve Board the power to imple-
ment enhanced regulations for banks whose size threatens the financial system). 
 185 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 756. 
 186 Id. at 756–59. 
 187 Id. at 748, 758. 
 188 See id. at 756–58 (noting that the enhanced prudential framework for large banks is intended 
to address systemic risk). 
 189 See Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 1299 (“The financial industry’s opposi-
tion has also bogged down the [Federal Reserve Board’s] efforts to establish enhanced prudential 
requirements for both nonbank [systemically important financial institutions] and bank SIFIs (banking 
organizations with assets over $50 billion), as required by Section 165 and 166 of Dodd Frank.”). 
 190 See id. at 1299–1301, 1301 n.50 (noting a meeting between Daniel Tarullo and the heads of 
“JPMorgan, [Bank of America], Goldman, Morgan Stanley, U.S. Bancorp, and State Street,” where 
the banks criticized the Federal Reserve Board’s efforts to implement the Volcker Rule and enhanced 
prudential regulation). 
 191 See id. at 1301–02 (indicating that the Federal Reserve Board had been slow to implement rules 
regarding enhancing prudential standards). The financial industry’s ability to beat back Dodd-Frank 
reforms was not confined to the implementation of prudential requirements. See DAVIS POLK, DODD-
FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (July 18, 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/July2014_Dodd.Frank_.
Progress.Report_0.PDF [https://perma.cc/9G8X-L9MF]. Four years after the bill’s passage, regulators 
had failed to meet 45.4 percent of rulemaking deadlines and implemented just over half of the bill’s 
total rulemaking requirements. Id. The fourth anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage marked 
the deadline for the implementation of the 280 rules with established deadlines. Id. By July 18, 2014, 
127 of these deadlines had passed without action. Id. In total, just 208 of Dodd-Frank’s 392 required 
rules had been passed. Id. These numbers gradually improved over the next two years. DAVIS POLK, 
DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT: SIX-YEAR ANNIVERSARY REPORT 2 (July 19, 2016), https://www.
davispolk.com/files/2016-dodd-frank-six-year-anniversary-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WKR-WP5F] 
(tallying rulemaking implementation as of July 2016). Still, as of July 19, 2016, banking regulators 
had successfully instituted only 274 of the 390 rules. Id. 
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beginning to erode.192 The Federal Reserve Board recently advanced a rule-
making proposal that would reduce the amount of capital that G-SIBs must 
hold.193 Although proponents argue that the change will minimally impact the 
amount of capital held by banks, critics argue large banks’ subsidiaries will 
hold less capital—increasing risk.194 
B. Dodd-Frank Hard Breakup Options 
Although not the focus of the regulatory overhaul, two Dodd-Frank pro-
visions authorize federal banking regulators to break up banks.195 The first, 
referred to as the Kanjorski Amendment, empowers the Federal Reserve Board 
to break up banks with over $250 billion in assets if the bank is a “grave 
threat” to the stability of the United States.196 This determination, however, 
must also attain a two-thirds majority vote from the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council (FSOC), which has ten voting members, consisting largely of the 
heads of federal financial regulators.197 The statute leaves undefined what con-
                                                                                                                           
 192 See Letter from Federal Reserve Staff to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20180411a1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9BMF-CAYZ] [hereinafter Federal Reserve Letter] (proposing GSIB surcharge reductions). 
 193 See id. (advancing a proposal to alter the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR); Jeff 
Stein, Fed Advances Plan to Weaken Post-Financial-Crisis Rule for Biggest Banks, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/24/fed-advances-plan-to-
weaken-post-financial-crisis-rule-for-biggest-banks/ [https://perma.cc/XK76-THA3] (indicating that 
the Federal Reserve’s put forward changes would lessen capital holding requirements for eight banks 
that “received taxpayer-funded bailouts after the 2008 crash”). 
 194 Compare Federal Reserve Letter, supra note 192, at 2 (arguing that the change would mini-
mally impact G-SIB’s capital holdings), with Letter from Sir Paul Tucker, Chair, Systemic Risk 
Council, to The Honorable Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, and Comptroller Joseph M. Otting (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.systemicriskcouncil.org/2018/
08/systemic-risk-council-opposes-federal-reserve-and-occ-proposals-to-reform-leverage-ratio-and-
volcker-rule/ [https://perma.cc/2DYJ-PM2L] (follow “Read the full letter here” hyperlink) (arguing 
the leverage ratio reduction makes banks more risky because “there would be a material reduction in 
equity requirements for operating bank subsidiaries”). 
 195 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 764; see 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(5) (2012) (providing regulators 
the power to force banks to sell or transfer assets when necessary to mitigate the grave risk they pose 
to the United States); id. § 5365(d)(5)(B) (providing regulators the power to sell or transfer assets 
when they have failed to submit an adequate living will). 
 196 See 12 U.S.C. § 5331 (providing the Federal Reserve Board regulatory enforcement options 
where a “a bank holding company with total consolidated assets of $50,000,000,000 or more, or a 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors, poses a grave threat to the finan-
cial stability of the United States”). An amendment to this section raising the asset requirement from 
$50 billion to $250 billion goes into effect November 24, 2019. The Amendment’s name reflects its 
sponsor, Representative Paul Kanjorski. See Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 1024. The 
Pennsylvania Democrat, who was a member of the House Financial Services Committee, was defeat-
ed in the 2010 election. Id. at 1024 n.309. 
 197 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321(b)(1), 5331(b). The ten voting members include: the Secretary of the 
Treasury who chairs the council, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy, the Director of the CFPB, the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
 
2214 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2185 
stitutes a “grave threat,” nor is “grave threat” a term of art in banking law.198 If 
the Federal Reserve Board and FSOC find that a financial institution posed a 
“grave threat” to the United States, they are authorized under section 
5331(a)(5) to break up the bank after a hearing.199 Nonetheless, this action 
would first require a finding that other remedies provided in subsection (a) 
would not redress the grave threat; these remedies include limiting future mer-
gers and acquisitions, restricting product offerings, requiring termination of 
certain activities, or imposing conditions on the bank holding company’s con-
duct.200 Regulators have yet to use this provision, and, notably, when the 
Dodd-Frank Act was passed the asset threshold for a bank to be subject to the 
Kanjorski Amendment was set at a $50 billion.201 In 2018, the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act raised the threshold 
to $250 billion, a move that lessened the number of banks potentially subject 
to breakup.202 
The second breakup provision is provided by section 165(d) of Dodd-
Frank.203 This provision allows the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to together determine that a bank with 
greater than $250 billion in assets has failed to adhere to the statutory require-
ments for providing an “orderly resolution plan.”204 Under Dodd-Frank, large 
banks are required to prepare “living wills” such that they could be efficiently 
                                                                                                                           
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairman of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration Board, and an independent member with insurance expertise ap-
pointed by the president. Id. § 5321(b)(1). 
 198 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 764 (“No definition of grave threat was discussed or given 
and the concept was not one that existed previously in banking law.”). 
 199 See 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(5) (“[I]f the Board of Governors determines that the actions described 
in paragraphs (1) through (4) are inadequate to mitigate a threat to the financial stability of the United 
States in its recommendation, [it shall] require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-
balance-sheet items to unaffiliated entities.”); id. § 5331(b) (requiring notice and a hearing before 
actions are taken against a bank holding company under subsection (a)). 
 200 Id. § 5331(a)(1)–(5) (listing “mitigatory actions” to be taken before effecting a breakup).  
 201 Id. § 5331(a)(5) (permitting action “[i]f the Board of Governors determines that a bank hold-
ing company with total consolidated assets of $ 50,000,000,000 or more . . . poses a grave threat to the 
financial stability of the United States”), amended by Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 401(c)(1)(C), 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (“striking 
‘$50,000,000,000’ and inserting ‘250,000,000,000’”). 
 202 See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 401(a)(1)(A). 
 203 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(5)(B) (“The Board of Governors and the Corporation, in consultation 
with the Council, may jointly direct a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Gover-
nors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a), by order, to divest certain assets or opera-
tions identified by the Board of Governors and the Corporation . . . .”). 
 204 See id. § 5365(d) (requiring companies to provide federal regulators resolution plans and 
providing the Federal Reserve Board and FDIC powers to ensure the compliance). 
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wound down should they fail.205 If a bank whose living will has previously 
been rejected fails to resubmit an adequate plan within two years of the rejec-
tion, and other remedies are exhausted, the Federal Reserve Board and the 
FDIC may, after consultation with the FSOC, break up the bank.206 Like the 
Kanjorski Amendment, this provision has not yet been used to break up a bank 
and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
raised the threshold from $50 billion to $250 billion, reducing the number of 
banks that must adhere to it.207 Moreover, federal regulators have indicated that 
they plan to reduce the frequency of the annual living will submissions.208 
C. Riegle-Neal Depository Cap 
Riegle-Neal does not expressly provide banking regulators the power to 
break up banks; however, it sets a concentration cap that serves a similar, but 
more limited, function.209 Specifically, section 1842(d) bars the Federal Re-
serve Board from approving a merger where the surviving bank holds more 
than ten percent of total domestic insured deposits, or thirty percent in any 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See id. § 5365(d)(1) (“The Board of Governors shall require each nonbank financial company 
supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection (a) to 
report periodically to the Board of Governors, the Council, and the [FDIC] the plan of such company 
for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure . . . .”). 
 206 See id. § 5365(d)(4)–(5) (setting forth notice of deficiencies and enforcement options for the 
Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC should the plan be inadequate during the initial or subsequent 
submissions). 
 207 See id. § 5365(a)(1) (“[T]he Board of Governors shall . . . establish prudential standards for 
nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies with 
total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50,000,000,000.”), amended by Economic Growth, 
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 401(a)(1)(A) (“striking ‘$50,000,000,000’ and 
inserting ‘250,000,000,000’”); Gina Chon, U.S. Banks Make Progress on Their Living Wills, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/dealbook/banks-
living-wills.html [https://perma.cc/ZGL3-SJR3] (noting that although five of the banks failed their 
living will assessments and were forced to submit improved plans in 2016, only four needed im-
provement and eight passed in 2017). Although a firm has not been broken up after failing the living 
will requirement, Wells Fargo faced activities restrictions after it failed to submit an adequate living 
will in 2016. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo ‘Living Will’ Plan Is Rejected Again by Regulators, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/dealbook/wells-
fargo-regulators.html [https://perma.cc/CML5-7JCF] (noting that Wells Fargo was “prohibit[ed] from 
establishing new international units or acquiring a subsidiary that is not a bank” until its living will 
resubmission was approved in March 2017).  
 208 Lalita Clozel, Banks to Get Slimmed Down ‘Living Will’ Requirements, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-to-get-slimmed-down-living-will-requirements-1543438728 
[https://perma.cc/9GS6-Y6ND] (“Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Jelena McWilliams, in a 
speech to a banking industry group, said her agency and the Federal Reserve are reviewing how to 
make the [living will plans] less burdensome on the nation’s largest banks and regional firms.”). 
 209 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2) (2012) (setting concentration limits on the proportion of nation-
wide and single-state deposits). 
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state, though states may alter this cap.210 Importantly, this cap only limits mer-
ger approvals and cannot be applied when a bank has acquired more deposits 
through natural business expansion.211 
After the crisis, Congress bolstered this provision.212 Section 622 of 
Dodd-Frank prohibits the Federal Reserve Board from approving mergers 
where the surviving bank would hold more than ten percent of all banks’ com-
bined liabilities.213 Moreover, Dodd-Frank clarified that the ten and thirty per-
cent deposit caps governs all banks that are FDIC-insured.214 This was a re-
sponse to actions taken by the Federal Reserve Board during the 2008 Finan-
cial Crisis.215 When Bank of America was attempting an emergency takeover 
of Merrill Lynch in 2008, Bank of America held 11.9 percent of total deposits, 
which would have prohibited the merger’s approval.216 The Federal Reserve 
Board, however, determined that the rule was inapplicable.217 Under its crea-
tive interpretation of the statute, the calculation of the depository cap did not 
include deposits held in thrifts and industrial banks.218 This strained reading 
reflected the belief that the dangers of financial concentration paled in compar-
ison to the harm that would arise from the failure of large financial institu-
tions.219 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See id. § 1842(d)(2)(A) (“The Board may not approve an application pursuant to paragraph 
(1)(A) if the applicant (including all insured depository institutions which are affiliates of the appli-
cant) controls, or upon consummation of the acquisition for which such application is filed would 
control, more than 10 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the 
United States.”); id. § 1842(d)(2)(B)–(C) (setting the state cap at thirty percent, but providing in sub-
section (C) that “[n]o provision of this subsection shall be construed as affecting the authority of any 
State to limit, by statute, regulation, or order, the percentage of the total amount of deposits of insured 
depository institutions in the State which may be held or controlled by any bank or bank holding com-
pany”). 
 211 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 728. 
 212 See id. at 729 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s changes to Riegle-Neal’s depository caps). 
 213 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (“[A] financial company may not merge or consolidate with, acquire 
all or substantially all of the assets of, or otherwise acquire control of, another company, if the total 
consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial company . . . would exceed 10 percent of the aggre-
gate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies . . . .”).  
 214 Id. § 1852(a)(2)(A) (defining a financial company to include any insured depository institu-
tion); BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 729 (noting that the Dodd-Frank explicitly established that the 
Riegle-Neal deposit caps apply to all “FDIC-insured depository institution[s]”). 
 215 BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 728–29. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement 
of Timothy Geithner, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/gei080403.html [https://perma.cc/8EPE-G22R] (referring 
to J.P. Morgan’s emergency acquisition of Bear Stearns, stating that “the risks are modest in compari-
son to the substantial damage to the economy and economic well-being that potentially would have 
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III. THE CURRENT BREAKUP OPTIONS ARE INADEQUATE AND  
NEW LEGISLATION IS REQUIRED TO REMEDY  
THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” PROBLEM 
Having provided an overview of the Dodd-Frank and Riegle-Neal 
breakup provisions, this Note proceeds in this Part by discussing the provi-
sions’ viability and the likelihood that they could be used by their respective 
enforcers.220 Section A highlights the limitations of the Riegle-Neal and Dodd-
Frank breakup provisions and the broader problem of relying on banking regu-
lators to institute this breakup.221 Section B argues that an adequate regulatory 
framework would provide for the nondiscretionary systematic divestiture of 
banks that achieve a specific size, but that these reform efforts would face sig-
nificant obstacles.222 
A. The Breakup Options Provided by Riegle-Neal and  
Dodd-Frank Are Unlikely to Be Used 
The breakup options provided to federal regulators under Riegle-Neal and 
Dodd-Frank are unlikely to be used and inadequately address the “too big to 
fail” problem.223 Riegle-Neal’s hard cap on deposits and liabilities, the latter of 
which is particularly well-suited to big banks, offers perhaps the best regulato-
ry option because it is automatic.224 Still, it is inherently limited because it can 
only be employed to prevent a prospective merger, rather than to affect a post-
hoc breakup.225 Moreover, the provision contains significant loopholes.226 The 
                                                                                                                           
accompanied Bear’s insolvency”). Importantly, section 1852 provides that the Federal Reserve Board 
may ignore the concentration limit in cases like Bank of America’s emergency acquisition of Merrill 
Lynch during the financial crisis. See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1) (“With the prior written consent of the 
Board, the concentration limit under subsection (b) shall not apply to an acquisition . . . of a bank in 
default or in danger of default . . . .”). 
 220 See infra notes 220–245 and accompanying text. 
 221 See infra notes 223–235 and accompanying text. 
 222 See infra notes 236–245 and accompanying text. 
 223 See Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 1288–94 (2013) (noting the extent to 
which Dodd-Frank has been weakened by Wall Street influence and regulatory laxity); Wilmarth, 
Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 988–92, 1024–25 (detailing the deficiencies of the Riegle-Neal caps 
and Kanjorski Amendment). 
 224 See Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 991–92 (explaining that the liabilities cap is 
particularly effective because “large financial companies (e.g. Citigroup, Goldman, and Morgan Stan-
ley) . . . rely mainly on funding from the capital markets instead of deposits”); Wilmarth, Turning a 
Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 1390 (“Large financial institutions have skillfully employed arbitrage and 
capture techniques to weaken the effectiveness of regulation. Both before and during the financial 
crisis, leading banks exploited flawed incentives and governance structures in regulatory agencies to 
encourage regulators to cater to their interests.”). 
 225 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (prohibiting the approval of mergers if the 10- or 30-percent depository 
cap is reached); id. § 1852 (prohibiting the approval of mergers if the 10-percent liabilities cap is 
reached).  
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state and nationwide depository cap can be evaded.227 Additionally, the “failing 
bank exception” provides regulators tremendous latitude to ignore the cap.228 
Dodd-Frank’s Kanjorski Amendment, which empowers regulators to 
break up banks that pose a “grave threat” to the United States, and section 
165(d), which allows for divestiture for failure to adhere to the living will re-
quirements, are similarly unlikely to be able to eliminate the “too big to fail” 
problem.229 Both include breakups as a last resort.230 Section 165(d) can only 
be used if a bank holding company successively fails to provide a document to 
the regulators regarding how the company can be effectively wound down; this 
section addresses only the most incompetent banks and can hardly be the basis 
for the systemic deconcentration of the banking industry.231 Likewise, under 
the Kanjorski Amendment, divestiture may only occur after the failure of a 
lesser remedial measure, a finding of a “grave threat” to the stability of the 
United States, and an approval of two-thirds of FSOC’s voting members.232 
These procedural hurdles are substantial and make it unlikely that the authority 
could be used with any widespread effect.233 
The inadequacy of these breakup options underscores that Congress and 
financial regulators have been unable to adequately address the ills of the 2008 
Financial Crisis.234 Scholars attribute this to the excessive influence of the fi-
nancial industry, pointing to outsized campaign contributions, regulatory cap-
ture, and a growing deregulatory mindset.235 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 988–92. 
 227 See id. at 990 (“[The deposit cap] does not apply the nationwide deposit cap to intrastate ac-
quisitions or mergers . . . [and] does not apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate transactions.”). 
 228 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1) (“With the prior written consent of the Board, the concentration 
limit under subsection (b) shall not apply to an acquisition . . . of a bank in default or in danger of 
default . . . .”); Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 988–89 (noting the “failing bank excep-
tion”). 
 229 See Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, 1024–25. 
 230 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(4)–(5) (2012) (indicating that the Federal Reserve Board and the 
FDIC may require a divestiture after attempting to “impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidi-
ty requirements, or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidi-
ary thereof”); id. § 5331(a)(5) (2012) (highlighting that the Federal Reserve can break up a bank if the 
other measures provided by the statute “are inadequate”); id. § 5331(b) (2012) (requiring notice and a 
hearing before actions are taken against a bank holding company under subsection (a)). 
 231 See id. § 5365(d)(4)–(5) (setting forth notice of deficiencies and enforcement options for the 
Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC should the plan be inadequate during the initial or subsequent 
submissions).  
 232 Id. § 5331(a). 
 233 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 14, at 1024–25 (arguing that the Kanjorski Amendment’s 
“procedural and substantive constraints” make it unlikely to be used to break up a bank). 
 234 See id. at 956 (“Dodd-Frank does not solve the [too big to fail] problem.”). 
 235 See Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 1293 (“While the industry could not 
prevent Dodd-Frank’s passage, it did succeed in weakening several of Dodd-Frank’s key provisions 
and in subsequently obstructing the statute’s implementation.”).  
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B. Avenues Forward 
In particular, an adequate regulatory framework would provide less dis-
cretion to federal banking regulators.236 This is essential because regulators are 
least likely to take action when the market is strong.237 Like other aspects of 
financial regulation, bank breakups are also unlikely to occur in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis because it would unsteady an already shaken market.238 
The Riegle-Neal depository cap provides a strong foundation from which a 
new law could be built.239 But, instead of applying the law solely to mergers, 
the law should apply more broadly and prevent firms from attaining a set per-
centage of deposits or liabilities, whether through merger or natural expan-
sion.240 Under a piecemeal breakup approach there will always be a biggest 
bank; however, because a cap applies to all banks it eliminates the arbitrariness 
of a regulator effectively choosing this institution through its breakup deci-
sions.241 
Growing concentration in the banking sector and the inadequacy of cur-
rent breakup options warrants the imposition of new legislation and regula-
tions.242 Nonetheless, the period of relative economic prosperity that has fol-
lowed the crisis makes it all the more unlikely federal regulators would attempt 
to use their discretion to exert greater influence.243 History suggests that new 
legislation is unlikely to result absent a new crisis.244 And, even then, our expe-
                                                                                                                           
 236 See McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation, supra note 134, at 1230 (“The most effective way to 
overcome regulators’ propensity toward inertia at the top of the business cycle is to tie their hands in 
advance through rules that automatically kick in when markets heat up.”). 
 237 Id. at 1229. 
 238 See BARR ET AL., supra note 9, at 729 (noting the extraordinary statutory interpretation under-
taken by the Federal Reserve to allow for the emergency acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of 
America). 
 239 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2) (prohibiting the approval of mergers where the resulting firm 
would exceed the depository cap). 
 240 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 214 (suggesting a hard cap be imposed to limit the 
size of “too big to fail” institutions). 
 241 See id. at 215 (“[A]ll banks, including risk-seeking ones, should be limited to a size where 
they do not threaten the stability of the financial system.”). 
 242 BERNANKE, supra note 2, at 441 (“I agreed with the administration view that breaking up 
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more incremental options had been tried and found wanting.”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 8, at 
208 (“Not only does the ‘better regulation’ approach ignore the impact of politics, but it fails to solve 
the underlying problem—the existence of [too big to fail] institutions.”). 
 243 See McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation, supra note 134, at 1229 (“It is hard enough to amass 
support for needed safeguards immediately after a crisis. Doing so when economic conditions are 
bright can threaten a regulator’s career.”). 
 244 Coffee, supra note 31, at 1020. 
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rience after the 2008 Financial Crisis calls into question whether that would 
provide a sufficient impetus.245 
CONCLUSION 
The breakup options provided by the Dodd-Frank and Riegle-Neal Acts 
are inadequate and unlikely to be used to remedy the growing concentration of 
power in the banking industry. Americans have waged battles over the appro-
priate size of banks since the country’s founding. Undoubtedly, banks have 
provided benefits that have increased Americans’ well-being and brought 
widespread prosperity. At the same time, Americans have demonstrated a will-
ingness to reject potential efficiency gains out of concern for the potential eco-
nomic, political, and social harms that can be wrought by a financial industry 
with outsized influence. If Americans hope to truly combat the “too big to fail” 
problem, it will require the passage of new legislation. 
LOGAN D. HOVIE 
                                                                                                                           
 245 Id. (noting the difficulty in implementing financial reform even after the 2008 financial crisis). 
